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ABSTRACT 
Norad’s Oil for Development (OfD) programme entered an agreement with Ghana in 
2008 following Ghana’s major oil discovery in the Jubilee Field in 2007. Mainly 
using policies based on the internationally approved concept ‘good governance’, and 
on Norwegian oil experience, the programme aims to assist the country in avoiding a 
resource curse. One area of focus in OfD’s programme is environmental governance 
and, using a political ecology approach, this study examines the nature of this 
assistance and its possible impact on Ghana’s environmental management of its oil 
industry. From a geographical perspective, the place-specificity of strategies, which is 
necessary in environmental management, is not sufficient, and the concept 
‘environmentality’ may be applied to describe the power-laden nature of the 
programme and the OfD discourse’s framing of issues related to the collaboration. 
Accusations of conflicts of interest between the private and public sector also lead to 
the programme omitting issues relevant to Ghana’s environmental oil governance. Its 
institutional capacity-building approach has, arguably, strengthened the structure of 
environmental institutions at the macro-level, but is unlikely to be sufficient in 
strengthening Ghana’s environmental management of its oil sector as a whole. 
Key words: political ecology; Ghana; Oil for Development; environmentality; 
Norwegian aid 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Ghana discovered commercial quantities of oil in 2007 and started production in 
2010, naming their oil field ‘Jubilee’, to mark the 50th anniversary of Ghana’s 
independence, and as a reflection of the nation’s optimism about their find 
(Dypedokk, 2012). The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation’s (Norad) 
Oil for Development programme (OfD) entered a partnership with Ghana in 2008 in 
order to assist Ghana in the governance of their oil, with this assistance being based 
on Norway’s expertise from their own oil industry. The OfD programme is based on 
the principle of ‘good governance’. This is given by many development agencies as 
being the key to avoiding negative trends which are commonly associated with a 
resource curse, particularly in post-colonial states in the global south (Logan and 
McNeish, 2012). With the environmental impact of oil production being potentially 
devastating when poorly managed, as can be seen in neighbouring oil nations such as 
Nigeria, one of OfD’s ‘pillars’ is environmental governance. This consists of a 
number of policies and tools aimed largely at strengthening management and building 
capacity.  
 
This study is a critical analysis of the OfD programme in Ghana, specifically 
regarding its policies for and impact on environmental management. This chapter will 
firstly introduce some of the main themes surrounding the geopolitics, governance 
and environmental impact of oil. It will then introduce the study area, Ghana, 
describing the dynamics of its oil industry, before moving on to a description and 
discussion of the OfD programme and its role in Ghana. It then brings these threads 
together in a discussion of the study topic and resulting research questions. 
 
1.1 The politics and geography of oil 
The nature of oil may be described as political since decisions about finding, moving, 
and using the resource bring together groups of people with different interests and 
agendas, including some of the most powerful actors in the global economy (Bridge 
and Le Billon, 2013). Oil is often viewed as a means to achieving industrialisation 
and a ‘take-off’ in development as described in Rostow’s model of development 
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(Potter et al., 2008), yet many countries have instead seen a worsening of their 
economy after oil production, with lower levels of democracy, and a greater chance of 
conflicts. This, in addition to various social and environmental costs, has caused many 
to experience oil as a curse rather than a blessing. Economists such as Collier (2010) 
describe the various mechanisms which may cause a ‘resource curse’, largely being 
centred around a lack of effective regulation through good governance. Policies of 
transparency and accountability, along with the strengthening of regulatory 
institutions, are often seen as key methods in avoiding or reducing its negative effects. 
 
The resource curse may be described as an idiographic phenomenon and each case is 
unique, as every dysfunctional oil country is dysfunctional in its own way (Maass, 
2010). Variation in the effects of the resource curse on well-being can also be found 
within a country, with rising inequality between different geographical spaces 
(Humphreys et al., 2007b). Resource curse literature is still very influential in both oil 
policy and practice, yet newer research suggests more focus on the connection 
between the specific social politics of oil and the global operation of the commodity 
markets (Logan and McNeish, 2012) in order to reflect the phenomenon’s 
geographical embeddedness. 
 
Oil itself is geographical as it physically moves from underground across space, being 
claimed by national governments and others along its path (Bridge and Le Billon, 
2013). It also crosses national boundaries, through pipelines, shipping vessels and its 
underground reserves, often causing conflicts of ownership and of responsibilities. 
The issue of responsibility is particularly relevant in issues of environmental impacts 
such as oil spills or the release of greenhouse gases, where pollution may also cross 
regional and national boundaries. Oil is multi-scalar, often being controlled by 
national governments, and international corporations and institutions, yet its effects, 
both positive and negative, can be very obviously seen at local levels of community. 
  
The key actors involved in the governance of oil are the state, the oil companies and 
civil society, these being influenced by a network of national and international politics 
and socio-economic factors. The state’s role in the governance of oil is very much 
focused on national and international policies used to avoiding a resource curse while 
civil society, a collective term for nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and non-
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corporate organisations and institutions, has also emerged as an important actor in the 
political economy of oil (Bridge and Le Billon, 2013). Through holding the 
government and oil companies accountable for their actions, many believe that civil 
society groups are a key in reducing the negative social and environmental costs of 
oil.  
 
Ferguson (2005) describes the oil industry as operating from within ‘secured 
enclaves’, with the extent of their ‘security’ and the way in which they are governed 
varying, depending on the states that have nominal jurisdiction over them. Ackah-
Baidoo (2013) argues that these enclaves shield the companies, preventing any 
company-community dialogue, and that it is therefore the role of the government to 
bridge civil society concerns between the other two actors. It is then the government’s 
role to both encourage oil production and economic interests, while at the same time 
communicating and enforcing civil society’s interests and social and environmental 
concerns. Watts (2004) uses the term ‘oil complex’ to describe the complex network 
of actors and mechanisms from global to local levels in which oil capitalism operates. 
This interplay between actors and mechanisms forms dynamic and place-specific 
results highly suited to geographical studies. Ghana’s experiences and position in the 
geopolitics of oil will therefore be unique, and the relationship between Norway and 
Ghana through the OfD collaboration will also produce unique consequences that this 
study will examine. 
 
1.2 The environmental impact of oil 
The production of oil creates different forms of environmental impact, which in the 
language of economics is known as a negative externality. This may be defined as the 
costs incurred by other members of society not taken into account by producers and 
consumers (Mulhearn and Vane, 1999). Using a more ecocentric approach, this study 
will use the expression ‘environmental impact’ or ‘cost’ in order to bring into the 
equation damage to the ecosystems themselves. Some of these environmental impacts 
are highly visible through media coverage, such as the ‘Deepwater Horizon’ oil spill 
in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010. Other costs are not so visible, often occurring on a 
smaller scale, but when aggregated, adding up to large scale consequences (Bridge 
and Le Billon, 2013). These include more long-term activities such as the regular 
	   4	  
chemical discharge from exploration, drilling and transportation. The early stages of 
exploration also have a potential environmental impact, with seismic waves used 
during exploration, which may be hazardous to marine fauna, and explosive activities 
(Patin, 1999). The impact on fishing industries, which many countries have 
experienced, is that trawling has become limited, complicated and dangerous. This is 
firstly due to exclusion zones around instalments, which attract fish with their bright 
lights yet exclude fishermen, and also due to structures being installed and 
abandoned. A burning issue, which this study unfortunately does not have the 
capacity to include, is the release of greenhouse gases from oil production and the use 
of oil’s associated products. The study will instead focus on the more local effects of 
water, land and air pollution. 
 
Oil itself may be released into marine environments through blowouts, accidental 
spills or intentional pollution. In open sea, oil is often rapidly diluted reducing 
negative impact on marine species, whilst coastal environments are more at risk of 
degradation, and the extent of impact here is dependent upon quantity, type of oil, 
meteorological and oceanographical conditions, and the marine and coastal 
ecosystems (Børresen, 1993). Damage to life along the coast is caused by direct 
physical contact with oil which covers marine life, either causing immediate damage 
or inhibiting an organisms life-function. Patin (1999) adds that less obvious 
consequences may also manifest themselves in the world ocean in the long term, due 
to its large inertia of response. These long-term effects include sea floor sediments 
which may contain oil particles for decades (Børresen, 1993).  
 
Nigeria has experienced an ecological disaster as a result of its oil industry, largely 
from oil spills and gas flaring. Unsustainable oil production has rendered the Niger 
Delta region one of the five most severely petroleum-damaged ecosystems in the 
world (Ayuba, 2012). There are approximately 300 spills per year in the Delta with 
devastating consequences for Ogoni fisheries and farms, and studies have revealed 
levels of hydrocarbons in Ogoni streams in 1997 of between 360-680 times the EC 
permissible levels (Watts, 2004). Although the geopolitics of Ghana’s oil is different 
from that of Nigeria’s, Ghana is nevertheless aware that it has a great challenge to 
face in its own environmental governance of the resource. 
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1.3 An introduction to Ghana 
	  
1.3.1 The political economy of Ghana 
Ghana is regarded by many as a ‘model country’ in terms of macroeconomic and 
political stability, investor friendliness, good governance, and efforts to reduce 
poverty, but yet it remains a relatively poor country (Gary, 2009). According to the 
World Bank, it has evolved into a stable and mature democracy showing good 
performance on democratic governance. The 2012 report of the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI) places Ghana between the 50th and 60th percentile on 
political stability, government effectiveness, and regulatory quality, rule of law, 
control of corruption, and voice and accountability (World Bank, 2014). This reflects 
an improving environment for democratic governance, more effective public 
institutions and persistent economic growth, with high growth prospects in the long-
term, despite the country also having a high fiscal deficit (ibid.). 
 
Commercial quantities of oil were discovered in 2007 off the western coast of Ghana, 
with production starting in late 2010, this being an unusually rapid progression. The 
Jubilee Field, located some 60 kilometres offshore in the Gulf of Guinea, has 
estimated reserves of about 2 billion barrels of oil and 5000 billion cubic feet of gas 
(Kumar et al., 2013). In 2011 there was also significant discovery in the Voltaic Basin 
with further discoveries expected following the issue of a large number of exploration 
licenses. There is additional potential in developing a downstream gas sector, which 
can generate domestic energy supply. Ghana’s oil reserves are relatively small, but 
many see the oil discovery as a great chance to boost Ghana’s development and to aid 
in meeting the UN Millennium Development Goals set for 2015. Indeed, GDP 
increased by 6,7 per cent in 2012, although it remains to be seen if the oil revenues 
will aid in poverty reduction. The management of these revenues will be decisive, and 
recent trends, such as the country announcing that it would ask the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) for financial help, may be an indication of poor management in 
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Fig.1 Offshore activity areas in Ghana. 
 
            Source: GNPC Ghana (2014).  
 
The oil reserves discovered so far are not so large that the country will become reliant 
on them, but will rather continue with a mixed economy, with principal exports being 
gold, timber, minerals and cocoa. Nationally, 43 per cent of the population are 
employed in the service sector, 42 per cent in agriculture and 15 per cent in industry 
(Ministry of food and agriculture, 2013). Fishing and farming are important 
livelihoods in the Western Region where oil has been discovered, and on a national 
basis. With fish being the preferred source of animal protein, about 75 per cent of 
domestic fish production is consumed locally, with over 2 million fishermen, 
processors and traders, about 10 per cent of the population, participating in this sector. 
Agriculture is mostly on a smallholder basis using traditional techniques, but some 
large commercial farms also exist (ibid.). 
1.3.2 Ghana’s geography and environment 
Ghana has a valuable coastline which, in addition to oil extraction, is used for 
tourism, human settlements, industrial development, mining and an extensive fishing 
industry (United Nations, 2011). Sekondi-Takoradi, also known as ‘the oil city’, has a 
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vibrant fishing industry linked to its urban economy and society, and the Western 
Region as a whole produces a third of the fishing harvest in the country, in addition to 
having one of the highest biodiversities (Obeng-Odoom, 2014). The region has 
wetlands, rainforests and nine major rivers that flow into it. It also has the Cape Three 
Points Forest Reserve, the last protected coastal forest in the entire Gulf of Guinea, 
and the Ankasa National Park, which is the most biodiverse terrestrial site in Ghana. 
The Jomoro District (Fig.2) is directly north of the Jubilee Field and contains the 
Amansuri wetland, which is the largest freshwater marsh in the Western Region.  
Many of the district’s beaches are used by nesting marine turtles. These features are 
also seen as an asset to the eco-tourism industry in the district (CRC-URI, 2010). 
Offshore, there are a number of lagoons which are important areas for the breeding of 
marine species, providing protection from large predators and a constant supply of 
nutrients (Obeng-Odoom, 2014).  
 
Fig. 2 Environmental sensitivity map of the Jomoro District, Ghana. 
 
      Source: Coastal Resources Centre, URI (2010). 
 
There are concerns as to the impact of the oil sector on these coastal and marine 
ecosystems. Oil spills can be devastating for marine and coastal environments, 
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including the humans who live there and who are largely reliant on resources from 
them for their livelihoods. With fisheries playing a major role in coastal areas and 
communities, and, in addition, inland communities being reliant on this source of 
protein, a reduction in catch or the polluting of marine species is of crucial importance 
in Ghana. The biggest fishing fleet in the Western Region is composed of canoes that 
are seen at every landing beach in the region (CRC-URI, 2010), and the small-scale 
nature of these fisheries make them particularly at risk. The very high human use 
ranking related to coastal fisheries in the Jomoro region can be seen in Fig. 2. In 
addition, fishing is very much the core of many coastal communities’ history, culture, 
economy and social structure (e.g. Overå, 2011), and environmental changes could 
affect the entire way of life in these communities. The country’s mining sector lead to 
a great deal of social and environmental costs, with mining towns such as Obuasi, 
Wassa and Tarkwa experiencing loss of land, jobs and deteriorating health in local 
communities (Obeng-Odoom, 2014) and there are fears that these experiences may be 
replicated in the oil sector if poorly managed. 
1.3.3 The environmental impact of oil in Ghana 
According to various media and academic sources, Ghana has already experienced 
environmental costs as a result of the oil industry, although the actual source of 
pollution may often be difficult to trace back to a specific activity or site, due to the 
physical nature of oil. Research carried out using water samples from the Jubilee 
Field indicated the discharge of low toxicity oil-based mud and discharges from 
drilling fluids, and an elevation of oil and grease levels, which affect water quality 
(Obiri, 2011). Further research on the concentrations of polycyclic aromatic 
hydrocarbons (PAHs) and total petroleum hydrocarbons in aquatic organisms was 
recommended in the study. Other scientific studies carried out by Ghanaian 
researchers have found similar results and describe the high metal concentrations in 
deep-sea sediment as potentially causing serious environmental and ecological 
implications such as loss of biodiversity (Nyarko et al., 2011, Kumar et al., 2013). 
 
Several NGOs, including Ghana’s Friends of the Nation (FON) have reported 
negative findings and trends, the most obvious being the washing ashore of 25 dead 
whales on the coast of Ghana since 2009, with the investigation report as to the reason 
for their deaths still outstanding (Friends of the Nation, 2014). Several local fishing 
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communities in the Western Region have reported that their coastline is covered in 
black decomposing sargassum, a free-floating seaweed, its colour leading it to be 
associated with oil production, although this has not been scientifically documented. 
Gas flaring has also been very much criticized, as the infrastructure for the utilisation 
of gas in Ghana has not yet been completed. This may also be associated with health 
issues. The communities, who have already complained about less catch due to the 
lights used around the rigs attracting fish, feel that the response to their complaints 
from the authorities so far is inadequate (Ackah-Baidoo, 2013).  
 
Several oil spills have also been reported, the first in November 2011, with an oil 
flake coating beaches in several fishing communities and waterfront hotels in Ghana’s 
Ahanta West District. No official clean-up action was set in motion, with locals 
apparently receiving little information about the incident and being left to clean up the 
oil (Badgley, 2012). Kosmos Energy has been held accountable for spilling toxic 
drilling mud on several occasions, although a clean-up was never initiated and the set 
fine never paid due to lack of sufficient legislation (ibid.). A source at the Ghana 
Maritime Academy (GMA) reported in Dogbevi (2011), also claims that there have 
occurred several more cases of both oil spills and dumping of toxic waste, polluting 
nearby beaches. The source claims that the absence of a Vessel Traffic Monitoring 
Information System (VTMIS) which could record activities of vessels calling at the 
country’s ports or passing through its territorial waters, in addition to weak 
legislation, continues to make the practice of dumping attractive to vessels which 
found it cheaper than legal disposal. 
 
Such incidents of pollution often lead to widespread social and environmental impacts 
which are hard to measure in economic terms alone, for example, concerning their 
effect on non-commercial marine species, or the impact on the everyday life of 
fishing communities. Critics are concerned that environmental protection strategies 
and impact assessments currently in place are insufficient due to institutional 
weakness. OfD’s environmental pillar offers expertise and capacity building to 
potential partner countries, aimed at strengthening some of these insufficiencies, and 
therefore assisting in better environmental governance.  
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1.4 The Oil for Development Programme  
The OfD programme was started by the Norwegian Government in 2005 with the goal 
of aiding ‘economically, environmentally and socially responsible management of 
petroleum resources which safeguards the needs of future generations’ (Norad, 2012b, 
p.3). It stresses that assistance is ‘tailor-made to suit domestic conditions and 
demands’ (ibid., p.9) and within the field of environmental management, methods 
include assistance to develop basic legislation, regulations and guidelines for 
management and systems for monitoring the industry. These include tools such as 
environmental and social impact assessments, risk reduction measures and action 
plans to reduce accidental pollution.  OfD also organises training modules through the 
international programme for petroleum management and administration (PETRAD) 
aimed at government officials within the oil sector, but which all can attend, on topics 
including environmental management. The programme has been described as a 
response to the resource curse hypothesis based on Norway’s understanding of ‘good 
governance’ (Solli, 2011). 
 
Ghana, through the state owned oil and gas company, Ghana National Petroleum 
Corporation (GNPC), applied for assistance from OfD shortly after the discovery of 
oil in 2007 and a contract was signed between Ghana and Norway in 2008. Ghana 
contacted Norway because its experience in the oil industry was sought after for 
institution building and knowledge transfer, according to Olsen, at the time the 
Norwegian minister-counsellor in Ghana and deputy head of mission for OfD in 
Ghana, quoted in Espelund (2010). The goals and objectives of OfD in Ghana are 
described as, ‘short-term co-operation to provide assistance to ongoing governance 
activities related to the Jubilee Field development, management of petroleum data and 
petroleum legislative framework. Long-term co-operation to provide advice and 
assistance with competence and capacity building to governance institutions within 
resource management, revenue management and environmental management’ (Norad, 
2012b p.36). 
 
In the area of environmental management there have been several areas of focus in 
Ghana. Firstly, a baseline survey carried out by the Norwegian Fritdjof Nansen ship 
which took sediment and water samples both prior to oil production and again, three 
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years later. Support was provided in developing an environmental needs assessment 
and strategic environmental assessment (SEA), and several training visits both in 
Ghana and Norway took place involving the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
and the Ministry of Environment, Science, Technology and Innovation (MESTI) from 
Ghana, and the Norwegian Ministry of Environment (MoE), Norwegian climate and 
pollution agency (Klif) and the Norwegian Directorate for Nature Management (DN). 
A spatial development framework for the Western Region was initiated, this lead by 
the Danish organisation Consultancy within Engineering, Environmental Science and 
Economics (COWI), but with Norwegian aid through OfD also playing a major role 
in the project. In addition, environmental advisers from MoE, Klif and DN (Klif and 
DN were later combined into the Norwegian Environmental Agency (NEA)) were 
made available for support related to petroleum activities (Norad, 2012b). 
 
The OfD programme has, however, been criticized on several counts. Firstly, there 
has been criticism of the programme for operating from an nomothetic perspective 
through failing to take into account the local factors of development and instead 
operating on the basis that ‘governance issues have predefined answers to be 
implemented by experts’ (Solli, 2011 p.66). The programme is also based on 
Norwegian experience whereas many oil exporting countries, including Ghana, are 
not in the same position as Norway was during its early extraction period. Norway’s 
avoidance of a resource curse is, arguably, due to a great number of social, political 
and economic variables making its oil history far more complex than often portrayed. 
 
Other criticisms include, that the programme targets countries where Norwegian 
companies operate or compete for licenses, that it targets the wrong institutions, and 
that informal power structures may overrun the programme’s good intentions (Solli, 
2011). Hansen (2007) adds that the programme is based on the leaders of the 
receiving country having good intentions for the oil money produced, intentions 
which he argues are not always in place, and also that Norwegian financial interests 
through, for example, the state owned Statoil, are incompatible with the programme’s 
interests. A large number of Norwegian companies, including Aker Solutions and 
Ocean Rig, currently have commercial interests in the Jubilee Field. It is also 
remarked that although Norway has a long history of foreign aid, OfD is the first 
substantial Norwegian aid programme in Ghana in the last three decades. Norad 
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previously provided aid for fishery modernization in the country during the 1960s and 
1970s (Simensen, 1991). 
 
1.5 Theme of study and research questions 
With these criticisms of the programme in mind, and including the complexities of the 
geopolitics of oil, this study will analyse the extent to which the environmental 
management of oil in Ghana may be improved using tools based on Norwegian 
expertise from its own oil industry. The resource curse phenomenon, being the 
foundation for OfD’s programme, is often studied using a political economy approach 
and its analysis often points to political and economic factors at a macro-level as 
being a main focus for policy-making and management strategies, often with external 
or interventionist policy implications. Attempting to achieve ‘good governance’, 
using tools such as capacity building to strengthen institutions, and practices of 
transparency and accountability in the companies involved in extraction, is defined at 
an international or national level as the main focal point for Ghana in order to avoid a 
resource curse. From a geographical perspective, there is little reference to local 
context and place-specificity (Logan and McNeish, 2012), despite the factors shaping 
Norway’s oil history being historically and geographically unique. 
 
‘Environment’ is a topic with an apparently sketchy inclusion in resource curse 
literature. When mentioned, it is often referred to from a macro perspective using 
terms such as the resource curse causing ‘devastating environmental damage’ (Karl, 
2007 p.257) and economic tools and management strategies at a national level being 
suggested as keys to reducing environmental externalities (Humphreys et al., 2007a). 
It may be argued, however, that environmental degradation is a field in which there 
are no generally accepted rules or norms as to which politics are to be used and that 
policy measures must therefore be agreed upon (Hajer and Versteeg, 2005). This 
makes environmental policy-making a complex and multi-levelled issue and the 
actors involved can be seen as part of a network of social commitments, ideas and 
power relations (Leach and Mearns, 1996) historically and geographically. This 
complex relationship between nature and society forms the foundation of political 
ecology.  
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A political ecology approach, including tools such as discourse analysis, provides an 
appropriate method of studying these factors and examining a deeper level of the 
implications of OfD’s work in Ghana, from a more environmental perspective. 
Discourse analysis studies the way in which knowledge is formulated and validated 
by society as truth and analyses the connection between the literary and the political 
(Dittmer, 2010). The study will investigate whether the programme may be viewed as 
a ‘blueprint development strategy’, based on Norway’s experience or if it can rather 
be deemed an inclusive and flexible strategy which uses a learning process approach, 
as described by Roe (1991). Such blueprint development strategies are often limited 
in their inclusion of local context, instead focusing on the macro-level of capacity 
building and securing ‘good governance’ discourses.  
 
The study will also examine the nature of development discourses and the extent to 
which they ‘frame’ environmental issues (Bøås and McNeill, 2004) in order to 
achieve acceptance and support for their policies. This may be described as a 
discourse’s hegemonic depth and extent (Peet, 2002 in Dittmer, 2010). Using post-
structuralist discourse analysis, a Foucauldian analytical perspective on power 
relations in OfD’s collaboration with Ghana will be used to examine the discourses, 
including motives for aid and the effect of this on policy. 
 
Main research question: 
To what extent can Norad’s Oil for Development programme aid Ghana in reducing 
the negative environmental impact which may be associated with oil production? 
 
The research has been organized and guided by the following sub-questions: 
• What strategies does the OfD programme use in order to improve the 
environmental management of oil in Ghana? 
• To what extent do these strategies use a place-specific and dynamic approach, 
as suggested by newer research? 
• How do different discourses surrounding the OfD programme describe its 
environmental policies and practices in Ghana? 
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• To what extent can a political ecology approach to analysis of these discourses 
contribute to the understanding of the challenges involved in strengthening 
Ghana’s environmental governance of oil? 
 
The main theoretical foundation for the study, described in Chapter 2, is firstly, issues 
and concepts surrounding the governance of oil and the resource curse. Development 
aid is then discussed, followed by theories and concepts from political ecology 
relating to environmental management, and the use of discourses and narratives in 
issues of environment and development. Data production for this study has been 
carried out in Norway as I was unable to travel to Ghana at the time due to family 
circumstances, and Chapter 3 will discuss the choice of methodology in relation to 
these circumstances, and how data production and analysis were carried out. Chapter 
4 presents the empirical findings from data production, and Chapter 5 discusses these 
findings, using the theoretical foundation to situate them in a broader geographical 








	   15	  
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
This section will describe some of the main geographical theories and concepts 
related to the research topic. The field of research crosses the boundaries of many 
disciplines, but three main theoretical areas can be distinguished: (1) The geopolitics 
of oil and the resource curse; (2) Development aid, including Norwegian foreign aid, 
petroleum-related aid and development discourses; (3) Political ecology and 
environmental discourses. The first group is relevant for understanding the general 
geopolitics of oil and will discuss the concept of the ‘resource curse’ and related 
political concepts such as ‘good governance’ and ‘capacity building’, which many of 
OfD’s policies are centred around. The second theoretical area on development aid 
examines the politics and power within and surrounding development programmes 
and thereby provides a foundation for discourse analysis of the OfD programme in 
Ghana. This introduces further concepts including ‘developmentality’ and ‘hegemonic 
discourses’ and a discussion of the use of ‘framing’ in development discourses. The 
third group is relevant to the understanding of the nature of environmental research 
and management of oil and how discourses and narratives are used in relation to 
these. Here the concepts of ‘environmental governance’ and ‘environmentality’ are 
introduced and discussed. 
 
2.1 Oil and the resource curse  
An appropriate starting-point in the geographical analysis of an oil-producing nation, 
particularly a post-colonial state, is the phenomenon known as the ‘resource curse’. 
According to the most traditional development theories prior to the 1980s, an 
abundance of natural resources was a blessing, enabling developing countries to 
achieve industrial development and economic growth. Since the late 1980s, however, 
studies have shown tendencies towards what has become known as the resource curse 
hypothesis, which suggests that an abundance of natural resources may actually be a 
curse for developing countries (Rosser, 2006). More specifically, trends have shown 
lower growth rates, lower levels of human development, more inequality and poverty, 
conflicts and in many cases, devastating environmental damage (Karl, 2007). 
Although this thesis does not contain an in-depth economic and political analysis of 
the resource curse’s causes and consequences, the hypothesis is relevant since the 
	   16	  
OfD programme is described as being largely based on it (Solli, 2011). It also 
provides an insight into the geopolitics of oil and the complexities oil-producing 
nations face which may, in turn, influence their environmental management.  
 
The geopolitics of oil extraction is unique, as described in the previous chapter. Oil’s 
nature as a non-renewable resource, and its production, which may be described as 
operating within ‘enclaves’, can cause economic and political distortions within a 
country known as a ‘resource curse’. Economic distortions that may occur are, firstly, 
a currency appreciation due to resource revenues having a negative impact on other 
industries, known as ‘Dutch Disease’. Secondly, economic disruptions may occur due 
to fluctuation in commodity prices (Humphreys et al., 2007b). A main political 
distortion, referred to as ‘rent-seeking behaviour’, may arise due to the gap (or rent) 
between the value of a resource and the cost of extracting it, which provides 
incentives for private and state actors to use political mechanisms to capture this rent 
(ibid.). This may lead to the eroding of democracy, and various forms of corruption. 
Van Gyampo (2011) uses Nigeria’s wide-scale corruption and uneven development as 
an example of this erosion of democratic processes and of institutional structures due, 
in part, to rent-seeking behaviour. 
 
Collier (2010) argues that initially weak governance is the cause of a resource curse 
and that democracy, good governance and accountability are therefore keys to 
avoiding it. Restraints upon government are fundamental to this democracy since 
natural resources provide strong incentives to eroding it. Research suggests that 
institutions are a key variable in determining whether a country’s natural resources 
will be a benefit or a curse (Kolstad et al., 2009). Solli (2011) argues that oil can 
become a curse, ‘if and when public institutions that are to govern it are incapable of 
executing their tasks and it is unclear which institutions have what roles and tasks’ 
(p.67). He states that institutions which will provide successful grounds for oil 
production have a strong bureaucracy, an absence of corruption and a reliable judicial 
system, factors which could explain Norway’s relative success as an oil nation. 
 
The resource curse is then place-specific. Dutch disease, for example, is not inevitable 
as may be seen in Malaysia, who used their revenues from resource export to 
diversify their economy (Collier, 2010) and arguable Norway, although the country’s 
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oil reliance is also a debated issue (e.g. Milne, 2014). According to the UN human 
development index, Norway ranks at the very top, Nigeria close to the bottom, and 
Malaysia just above the middle scores, these all being resource rich oil-producing 
countries. Inequalities also arise within a country due to distortions in the economy, 
with rich countries containing poor people (Humphreys et al., 2007b). 
 
In summary, Collier describes the resource curse equation as the quality of 
governance relative to the value of natural assets. The quantity and value of the 
natural resource, and the value and diversity of other industries in the country are 
therefore highly relevant in the equation. With such variation, it is of interest to study 
each country with extractive industries in its unique context in order to examine the 
variables and study correlations. With governance being a key in the likelihood of 
experiencing a resource curse, internationally accepted strategies used by 
development organisations in oil-producing countries, such as the World Bank and 
OfD, are based on the concept of ‘good governance’, but what does the term actually 
imply? 
2.1.1 Good governance 
There are numerous definitions of ‘governance’ and ‘good governance’ with most 
containing concepts related to democracy, accountability and anti-corruption 
measures and some giving specific policy implications rooted in various socio-
economic and political dimensions. In general, definitions of ‘good governance’ are 
more normative than those of ‘governance’, focusing more on specific policies of 
what ought to be (Grindle, 2011). Solli (2011) describes good governance as a term 
originating from the World Bank, used in relation to an analysis of their structural 
adjustment programmes (SAP). The idea is based on the view that African states are 
‘failed’, the reason given for the SAPs not having the desired effect. In a failed state, 
governance is therefore seen as too weak to receive aid, and very little constructive 
results from the aid due to lack of management. In other words, the lack of capacity in 
the authorities impedes the aid programmes in reaching their stated goals 
(Utenriksdepartementet, 2004 in Solli, 2011). Capacity building is therefore seen as 
another key concept contained in good governance. 
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The World Bank today, describes good governance as often being defined in terms of 
the mechanisms thought to be needed to promote it. In general, however, they have 
taken as a starting-point the five dimensions of good governance that was developed 
in the World Bank’s Corruption Study for Europe and Central Asia and contained in 
the Bank’s public sector strategy: public sector management, competitive private 
sector, structure of government, civil society participation and voice, and political 
accountability (World Bank, 2013a). OfD describe principles of good governance 
such as transparency, accountability, anti-corruption and gender equality as being 
cross-cutting in all assistance provided, and that this assistance emphasizes capacity 
development in public sector institutions. Support is also provided to international 
organizations, civil society, media and parliamentarians (Norad, 2013). OfD’s 
definition of good governance is therefore normative, and its policy implications 
reflect Norway’s own experiences from the oil industry, in addition to being guided 
by internationally accepted strategies on resource extraction, such as those used by the 
World Bank. 
 
A strong and independent civil society is described as a necessity to achieve good 
governance. According to Collier (2010), it is exactly ‘social pressure’ that is 
necessary in avoiding what he calls ‘plundering’, a term greatly resembling rent- 
seeking behaviour associated with a resource curse, and he stresses the importance of 
making the right choices along a chain of decisions, influenced by this social pressure, 
where every decision may be considered a potential weak link. Although aid 
programmes such as OfD include support of civil society as a part of good 
governance and therefore their programme policies, such support is often 
marginalized. In the case of OfD, the aid is financial only and comprises 
approximately 10% of their budget (Solli, 2011).  
 
The quality of governance is often measured using a rating called the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG), which forecasts financial, economic and political risks 
using a set of 22 components. Overall, a political risk rating of 0.0% to 49.9% 
indicates a Very High Risk; 50.0% to 59.9% High Risk; 60.0% to 69.9% Moderate 
Risk; 70.0% to 79.9% Low Risk; and 80.0% or more Very Low Risk. In 2012, Ghana 
was assessed at 66.5 for political risk and 69.5 composite risk, increasing from 64.5 
and 66.5 respectively, in 2011 (PRS Group, 2012). Other indicators include the World 
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Bank’s Worldwide Governance indicators (WGI), which place Ghana at 
approximately 55% in 2012, where 0 is lowest and 100% is highest score (World 
Bank, 2013b). Norway comes in at approximately 96% and Nigeria at 15%, for 
comparison. There are, however, debates as to how accurate such ratings are, since 
the components they are based on relate largely to the meaning the individual 
organizations place in the terms ‘governance’ and ‘good governance’ (Grindle, 2011). 
They give an indication, however, of the state of institutions and quality of 
governance, and thereby the likelihood of a resource curse occurring in resource- 
extracting countries, according to the principles given in the majority of resource 
curse literature. 
 
Development discourses using the term ‘good governance’ have been criticized 
because of the normative nature of the term, and it has been suggested that Norway’s, 
and that of a number of other Western countries’, approach to good governance 
seemed to symbolize visions of the donor country’s own state and democracy 
(Hoebink, 2006 in Solli, 2011). The World Bank’s use of the term ‘good governance’, 
and other development organizations that have adopted the concept, often focus on 
capacity building at the macro-level in order to achieve this ideal state. Solli (2011) 
argues that capacity building is very much a political issue since it involves questions 
of whose capacities to prioritize and build and for whose purposes. This is also in 
agreement with Bøås and McNeill (2004), who suggest that developing agencies may 
use terms such as ‘good governance’ in a way which appears to be common sense and 
therefore hard to argue against, since it is a term with obviously positive connotations. 
Section 2.2.1 will further discuss the use of development discourses in the context of 
development aid. 
2.1.2. Post-resource curse  
Newer research on extraction industries suggests that the hypothesis of the resource 
curse tends to stereotype national politics and flatten out critical social and historical 
evaluation (Logan and McNeish, 2012). From a geographical perspective, the 
approach is largely focused at a macro level. It analyses national and international 
institutions with the main conclusion being that strengthening national institutions and 
using transparency and accountability in political and economic policies will lead to 
avoidance of a resource curse. The focus on democracy or good governance is largely 
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at a national level with little reference to local context. The theories and approaches 
suggested for avoiding a resource curse operate from a political economy perspective, 
often with external or interventionist policy implications. Logan and McNeish (2012) 
suggest exploring how and why effective local, regional, national, and international 
institutions actually work in particular times, places and circumstances. They criticize 
economists such as Collier’s ‘technocratic approach’ and suggest a more dynamic one 
using qualitative social geography in addition to the political economy of resource 
extraction (p.16). 
 
In addition to focusing on local knowledge and civil society participation, Bridge and 
Le Billon (2013) also suggest that oil governance institutions at the international level 
are thinly developed and describe the need for an effective platform to negotiate the 
place of oil in the long term. Many of those in existence today, such as the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), are tied to their producer 
or consumer roots, they argue, and those which are not, such as Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI), are only driven by voluntary participation. 
 
In order to study environmental management, the focus of this study, it is necessary to 
include this dynamic, geographical context, including the nature of social and cultural 
groups in their locales. The peripheral nature of the environmental impact of oil in 
resource curse theory leaves what may described as a ‘knowledge gap’ (Ostrom, 
1998) with policies being angled mostly towards economic and political governance. 
Theories and concepts surrounding the study and management of nature-society 
relations and their inclusion in policies aimed at good governance are discussed in 
sections 2.3, Political ecology and 2.4. Environmental discourses and narratives. 
 
2.2 Development aid 
It is important to consider the nature of development aid and the reasons for giving it 
(Potter et al., 2008) and although aid in general is said to be based on altruistic 
motives, there is a great deal of literature analysing hidden connections in the aid-
system and ulterior motives of donors. It may be argued that there is no such thing as 
a free gift and that the receiver of a gift will always be in a diffuse form of debt to the 
donor (Mauss, 1995 in Nustad, 2003). In the context of development, this concept has 
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played out in different ways and the history of foreign aid is filled with murky 
examples of SAPs and other development strategies which led to unwanted and often 
unexpected consequences. An example from Ghana is a World Bank development 
project in the 1980s which did lead to a growth in GDP, but also to the reduction of 
the country’s forest area to 25 per cent of its original size by the late 1980s. This was 
due to increased timber exports as a result of trade liberalisation required by SAPs 
(Rich, 1994 in Potter et al., 2008). 
 
Scott (1998) describes development schemes as being carried out in spatially and 
temporally unique settings and to ignore these particularities is an invitation to 
practical failure, social disillusionment or both. This is in agreement with the use of a 
dynamic principle, as described by Logan and McNeish (2012). Scott argues for the 
use of this geographical perspective, which includes the particularities of space and 
time, in a constantly changing natural and human environment, since the more general 
the rules, the more translation they need to be locally successful.  
 
The ‘gift’ of development aid in earlier periods, such as in the example given above 
regarding Ghana and the World Bank, did not use this geographical perspective, 
instead focusing on one particular aspect of economic growth and liberalisation. The 
power of the ‘gift’ in this sense is its ability to define one view as ‘true’, while 
silencing other views (Nustad, 2003). This concept is the core of the use of 
development discourses. 
2.2.1 Development discourses 
A discourse may be defined as sets of connected ideas, meanings and practices 
through which we talk about or represent the world (Aitken and Valentine, 2006). 
These ideas and meanings may be described as knowledges, and are culturally and 
historically specific (Wylie, 2006). Development agencies can be said to use 
discourses and narratives to achieve their goals, given that politics is socially 
constructed and that the distribution of power will decide their influence, such as how 
these discourses may become hegemonic (Roe, 1991). Bøås and McNeill (2004) 
analyse the relationship between ideas and power and describe developing agencies as 
often adopting a doctrine of political neutrality. This includes using terms such as 
‘good governance’, as previously described, which they argue is a term hard to view 
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from a negative perspective. They describe this process as ‘framing’ which firstly 
draws attention to a specific issue and secondly determines how such an issue is 
viewed, this through silencing certain aspects that are not neutral or positive in their 
discourse and accentuating those that are. 
 
Peet (2002) in Dittmer (2010) refers to a discourse’s hegemonic depth and hegemonic 
extent, with hegemonic depth being its regulatory power through the use of framing 
of topics and approaches, and extent being the geographic distance across which the 
discourse becomes hegemonic. By examining how behaviour, attitudes and beliefs, or 
knowledges, become sedimented and reproduced through repetition (Wylie, 2006) it 
is possible to establish the hegemonic depth and extent of a discourse. Dittmer (2010) 
describes this ‘sedimentation’ of discourses in policy as ‘policy discourses’, which 
become manifest in material practices by the state through repetitive performance, 
giving examples from discourses surrounding NATO and the EU. In this sense, 
discourses are both descriptive and performative since they are embedded in material 
social practices, behaviour, institutions and constructed environments (Sayer, 2000 in 
Dittmer, 2010). This study will examine the extent to which OfD’s discourse has been 
reproduced through repetition, amongst actors in Norway and in Ghana, or its 
hegemonic depth and extent. 
 
The concept ‘new aid architecture’ has been used to describe the shift in development 
discourses from top-down approaches based on conditionality, such as that used in 
SAPs, to participation and partnership from a bottom-up approach (Sande Lie, 2011). 
This shift is partly in order to include civil society, in agreement with the good 
governance definitions and policies described above. Participation in practice, 
however, is often limited to the implementations stages of projects and is aimed at 
mobilising community groups rather than empowering them to influence and share 
control over development (Malena, 2000 in Potter et al., 2008). Scott (1998) argues 
that many development schemes, despite their apparently good intentions, have little 
confidence in the skills, experience and knowledge of ‘ordinary people’ (p.346), 
another argument as to why participation in development programmes may be largely 
rhetoric. 
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Sande Lie (2011) uses the concept ‘developmentality’ to describe the asymmetrical 
relationship between donor and receiver, where donor institutions are applying new 
forms of governance that enable them to retain control, although their rhetorical 
claims may suggest the opposite. Developmentality is built on Foucault’s concept 
‘governmentality’ or the ‘art of government’, through which governments aim at 
producing citizens best-suited to fulfilling their policies (ibid.). Developmentality 
denotes that although the donor’s development discourse includes the promise of 
partnership, participation and self-governance, this execution of freedom is framed by 
the donor’s objectives and standards and thus the will to make their own concepts, 
policies and practices hegemonic. 
 
Development agencies may also use narratives which Roe (1991) defines as a story or 
argument which may be distinguished from, but may have its roots in, ideology, myth 
and conventional wisdom in development theory and policy. He describes the 
objective of such a narrative as persuading the reader to believe something or to act a 
certain way, much the same as a discourse, and that it is structured as a story where a 
situation or event leads to a certain consequence. Adger et al. (2001) add that a 
narrative also contains a cast, or the ‘heroes’,  ‘villains’ and ‘victims’ in the story, 
which, for example, in the case of an oil spill in Ghana, could describe OfD’s 
environmental aid as being the heroes, the local communities and fishermen as the 
victims and the oil companies as the villains. Neumann (2005) adds that actors may 
agree on the central facts and events of a narrative but yet come to very different 
conclusions about causes and effects. 
 
Development narratives may often fail to take into account the uncertainties which 
may occur in development strategies and to lack empirical support when tested, 
leading many to question what may be described as ‘blueprint development’, and to 
adopt a more learning-process approach which allows for trial and error (Roe, 1991). 
This view supports the arguments given above in post-resource curse literature, that 
development schemes should be based on a dynamic principle, using a geographical 
approach. 
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2.2.2 Petroleum-related aid 
Bridge and Le Billon (2013) argue that petroleum-related aid programmes such as 
OfD have a limited affect alone, since oil wealth often insulates producer 
governments from both external and domestic pressure (p.202). This is similar to the 
concept of oil enclaves as described by Ferguson (2005) or a ‘state within a state’ 
(Bridge and Le Billon, 2013 p.159). A strong civil society is therefore required to 
penetrate these enclaves and hold the government accountable. Civil society is 
supported by aid agencies such as OfD but, as previously discussed, only with a small 
per cent of their budget. 
 
Kolstad et al. (2009) highlight the need for petroleum-related aid programmes to 
reflect the policy implications of recent research in resource curse theory and the need 
to strengthen the right kind of institutions (p.954). They argue that institutions that 
work well in Norway, for example, do not necessarily work well in other social and 
political contexts and that institutions may also be hard to change due to their unique 
history and vested interests. This again supports the use of place-specific and dynamic 
strategies in development aid. 
 
There is also the argument that rather than focusing on the governance of oil, the long 
term goal should be to move beyond oil (Bridge and Le Billon, 2013) and therefore 
that development assistance should focus on reducing the reliance on mineral exports 
such as oil (Maass, 2010). Reasons for this are environmental at local and global 
scales, with global warming being central to the argument, and also social, due to the 
inequalities oil can cause in countries that have not managed to govern the resource 
sufficiently (ibid.). Although Norad provides aid to sustainable energy research and 
programmes, OfD does not include this aspect in its programme, as the name implies. 
2.2.3 Norwegian aid and Norwegian oil 
Specifically related to Norwegian aid programmes, there are discussions as to the 
nature of Norway’s foreign aid and the motives for the huge sums it spends on it each 
year. Tvedt (2009) describes Norway as having a national ‘do-gooders regime’, 
defined as a normative regime where ideas and rhetoric about ‘doing good’ regulate 
the system’s internal relations and give it its external legitimacy (p.26). He argues that 
research on Norwegian development aid must free itself from the pompous image 
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with which the field portrays itself, and from dogma and moralisation’s discursive 
realm (p.11). The Norwegian model is described as a symbiosis between research, 
organisation and state but Tvedt argues that some development schemes based on 
spreading this Norwegian model are somewhat flawed from the start. An example is 
that there may be conflicts of interest, as described in a case involving Norsk 
Folkehjelp and Statoil in Angola, where Statoil had financed a demining machine 
costing 3.4 million Norwegian Kroner on the condition that Norsk Folkehjelp worked 
to promote Statoil’s interests in Angola. Many of the key actors involved in this and 
other aid projects were also personally involved in both private and state interests. It 
has been claimed that Angolans and Nigerians hardly see the difference between 
Norwegian aid workers and Norwegian oil representatives, especially since the 
embassies are responsible for co-ordinating aid (Solli, 2011). 
 
In an interview in Maass (2010), Sadad al-Husseini, regarded as an expert on the oil 
industry, admits that corner-cutting in the oil industry is the norm, which deems it 
valid to question how a country with economic interests in Ghana can at the same 
time remain neutral in its position as ‘teacher’ and ‘protector’. Husseini explains that 
oil companies, as any other companies, are exposed to commercial pressures and 
when facing financial troubles will cut corners often in areas of health, safety and 
environmental guidelines (ibid.). Logan and McNeish (2012) describe Norway as a 
country of wealth and peace but question the validity of a ‘Norwegian model’ due to 
its ‘questionable investments and dealings abroad’ through Statoil and its Government 
Pension Fund Global (GPFG) (p.8). Although Statoil is not a direct investor in Ghana 
at the time of writing, Norway has a great number of investments in the oil industry as 
suppliers of goods and services, with large companies such as Ocean Rig and Aker 
Solutions having a strong presence there. Ihlen in Solli (2011) argues that the 
Norwegian oil industry badly needs support for the view that its companies and aid 
programmes ‘do good’ abroad, in order to expand internationally. The reasons for a  
petroleum-related aid programme being the first substantial Norwegian aid 
programme in Ghana the last few decades may be questioned in this respect. 
 
Tvedt (2009) describes the research behind many Norwegian aid-policies as being 
judged by a single bureaucrat from the aid-organisation who validates his choice on 
the basis that the research will benefit certain users’ interests. He describes this use of 
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power as random and undemocratic (p.94). This can be seen in regard to questioning 
the scientific validity of research, given that the nature of science is also politically 
constructed. There are then questions regarding whether OfD’s programme is based 
on the most applicable and relevant research on oil extraction and environmental 
management, or if there may also be conflicts of interest involved here.  
2.3 Political ecology 
The use of discourses and narratives in issues relating to development and 
environment is a central aspect in political ecology and many of the concepts 
introduced in the previous sections may be studied using this approach. Theories and 
methodology from the discipline are relevant in this study in order to examine 
discourses being used by OfD and how they relate to its practice in the area of 
environmental management in Ghana. The foundation for political ecology is that 
environmental problems may be perceived in a variety of ways (Blaikie, 1985 in Peet 
and Watts, 2004) and may therefore be considered socially constructed. A political 
ecology perspective to research then, defines that human transformation of natural 
ecosystems must be understood in relation to the political and economic structures 
and institutions in which these transformations are embedded (Neumann, 2005 p.9). 
Adger et al. (2001) argue that a key issue in political ecology is the analysis of multi-
level connections between global and local phenomena in environmental issues as 
well as decision-making and hierarchies of power. Using methods such as discourse 
analysis, this approach is often used to uncover these underlying structures and 
political construction in relation to empirical research. It is widely argued that the 
material analyses in political ecology cannot be conducted in the absence of, or 
separated from, discourse analysis (Neumann, 2005). 
 
Given the political and economic embeddedness of nature-society relationships, 
analysis of environmental issues necessitates the inclusion of this multi-scale 
complexity, particularly concerning widespread social and environmental impacts 
which cannot necessarily be efficiently measured in economic terms. Patin (1999) 
argues that there are no commonly accepted methods of Environmental Impact 
Assessments (EIA) or attempts to describe the state of an ecosystem, and a qualitative 
approach is therefore necessary. The advantages are that this allows us to differentiate 
impact factors and provides a relative assessment of possible consequences of these. 
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Robbins (2006) argues that theories of environment were invariably linked to theories 
of political domination in colonial states, which has lingered on well into the post-
colonial era. He questions the role of research and the way forward for those seeking 
to analyse social and environmental processes, while admitting the political 
embeddedness of any claims about society and nature (p. 314). His suggestions are to 
carry out empirical study of how organisations operate, how local people engage with 
agencies and knowledges under conditions of unequal power, and to expose alliances, 
positions and practices and what effect these have. Methodologies used must unite 
scientific environmental research questions with inquiry into the power of science.  
2.3.1 Criticisms of political ecology 
Political ecology has been criticized for leaning too much towards political events as 
the cause of environmental change, with too little focus on the environmental events 
or processes themselves. Vayda and Walters (1999) argue that some political ecology 
research prejudges political factors as being the most important by using restrictive 
questions about how events are affected by factors privileged in advance by the 
researcher. He suggests rather the use of ‘event ecology’ which includes more 
detailed study of actual environmental changes using open questions about why these 
events have occurred. This study does not have the capacity to include any specific 
details of biological data and research, which this argument implies a necessity for, 
but a larger study could introduce further data of this nature, in addition to political 
analysis. However, there is also the discussion of what actually constitutes the 
‘ecology’ and ‘environment’ that Vayda and Walters describe, since political ecology 
opens up the definition of ‘environment’ itself as being socially constructed (Peet and 
Watts, 2004). 
 
Bryant (1998) describes the need for more focus on the link between the 
organizational attributes of actors and their capacity to act in political-ecological 
conflicts. He argues that much research in the field of political ecology has focused on 
the role of the state, but less on the role and capacity of other organisations such as 
NGOs, businesses and community groups. This is an angle which is relevant in this 
study and is more present in newer political ecology research. 
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2.4 Environmental discourses and narratives 
Adger et al. (2001) define two forms of discourse regarding environmental impact as 
global environmental management (GEM) and populist. They describe GEM 
discourses, for example used by development agencies, as claiming the existence of a 
global environmental crisis and defending the use of top-down, interventionist and 
technocentric solutions defined at a macro-level. Populist discourses are often more 
concerned with negative local impacts as a result of such external interventions and 
are used by, for example, environmental NGOs. Political construction and use of 
scientific knowledge in these discourses can be revealed using discourse analysis. 
 
The concept of ‘environmental governance’ refers to the analysis of a qualitative shift 
in the manner, organisations, institutional arrangements and spatial scales by which 
formal and informal decisions are made regarding uses of Nature (Bridge and 
Perreault, 2009 p.475). Within this field, studies that are concerned with the way in 
which discourse and the apparatus of governance are increasingly centred on 
environmental phenomena are referred to as ‘environmentality’ or ‘eco-
governmentality’ this being evolved from Foucault’s ‘governmentality’ (ibid.) in 
much the same way as Sande Lie’s concept of  ‘developmentality’. This is then 
concerned with the Foucauldian perspective of power, discipline and subject 
formation within environmental governance. Agrawal (2005) defines 
environmentality as the knowledges, politics, institutions and subjectivities that come 
to be linked together with the emergence of the environment as a domain that requires 
regulation and protection (p. 226). His studies in India examine the way in which 
‘expert knowledge’ and methods of governance influence individual interests so as to 
bring them in line with the interests of those in positions of power. Bridge and 
Perreault (2009) argue that institutions, organisations and relations of environmental 
governance are inherently power-laden and analyses of this governance should 
therefore aim to uncover this power-geometrics and examine their origins and 
implications (p.492). Development agencies working with environmental issues are a 
common study group within the field. 
 
Goldman (2001) argues that the World Bank uses environmentality through the 
financing of a process that specifically targets resource-based populations, accounts 
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for them and the quality of their environment, and compels participation in a new 
global environmental governing process. He describes the role of SEAs, and the 
professionals (or experts) who develop them, as being critical to this process, in 
addition to the process of restructuring state institutions through the use of techniques 
such as capacity building (p.194). This shift occurs through a process whereby local 
officials learn that in order to ‘speak with expertise’ on development and planning 
issues, they must adopt the neoliberal eco-rationalities and technologies presented to 
them at workshops, planning sessions, and projects. The imperative to use these 
concepts and tools, in order to be taken seriously, compels local officials to advance 
policies and projects that re-order institutional, ecosystems and human landscapes in 
ways that are accountable to market-forms of government and development 
(Goldman, 2004). There are also variables here, however, such as the actors, 
technologies and ideas included in the projects, and to gain a more complete picture, 
one must also take into account the views and statements of those who are being 
targeted by eco-governmental projects (Ward, 2012). This implies the need for a 
greater focus at the level of individual actors, using empirical study from a 
geographical perspective. 
 
Northern aid agencies use a discourse that Goldman (2001) describes as ‘green 
development knowledge’, which overlaps with processes of professionalism, 
authoritative forms of power and disciplinary mechanisms (p.205). Opponents of the 
World Bank’s and other agencies’ projects and strategies question the role of their 
scientific authority. When critically analysing environmental narratives and 
discourses, Neumann (2005) suggests that we do not reject science and empiricism, 
but rather recognise that scientific knowledge must be specified and contextualised 
geographically, historically, culturally and politically.  
 
Environmentality, then, examines the extent to which, for example, development 
agencies use the framing of expert knowledge, and various techniques of governance, 
in order to gain influence over individuals and make their policies and practices 
hegemonic. These specific factors are emphasized in the perspective as being relevant 
in order to examine the field of environmental governance, and may be situated 
within the broader concepts of hegemonic depth and extent, and that of policy 
discourses. 
	   30	  
2.5 Incorporating the concepts and theories 
Using discourse analysis from a political ecology perspective, this study will seek to 
incorporate the concepts described in this chapter in the empirical analysis of OfD’s 
environmental management. It will look at how the resource curse discourse is being 
used in OfD’s development discourse and the extent to which the programme 
incorporates newer suggestions within this field including the use of a geographically-
specific and dynamic approach. It will then examine the nature of OfD’s development 
aid and the politics surrounding the programme in relation to Norway’s status as an 
oil-producing country. Using discourse analysis, it will examine power relations and 
possible motives for the programme, exploring the extent to which the discourses may 
be described as hegemonic, incorporating the concept of developmentality. 
 
Relating Robbins’ theories and methodologies regarding the political embeddedness 
of claims about society and nature to the research questions, the study will investigate 
firstly if oil pollution has occurred in Ghana’s Western Region, and continue by 
analysing who carried out the research, how the pollution is categorised and by 
whom, who the research is being financed by and who may gain from its results being 
positive or negative. It will also look at local participation, or how local groups have 
engaged with OfD actors and to what extent their knowledges have been included or 
framed. Using the concept of environmentality, the study will examine the political 
nature of OfD’s environmental governance in Ghana, including how expert 












	   31	  
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter outlines and discusses the choice of methodology for the study, both in 
data production and in the analysis of the data. The theme of this study, an analysis of 
OfD’s environmental management programme in Ghana, calls for qualitative methods 
of research from human geography. The study uses intensive qualitative research, 
described in Clifford et al. (2010) as being focused on a single case study, or small 
number of case studies, with the maximum amount of detail, which is analysed to 
reveal connections between events, structures and mechanisms.  
 
Primary data production was carried out in Norway during the autumn of 2013. This 
consisted of five semi-structured interviews with six informants (see appendix 1). 
Discourse analysis has been the main tool employed to explore the texts and 
transcripts. Purposive sampling has been used, which seeks to maximize variation by 
including the extreme situations or discourses, in order to include all possible 
situations and views (Gobo, 2004). In order to use this method, policy documents, 
reports, evaluations, and other texts, many of which were provided by the informants 
themselves, have also been analysed using the same textual analysis techniques as the 
interview transcripts. In the analysis of both the primary and secondary data, 
background research into the text’s social circumstances, including its author, 
production and circulation (Waitt, 2010) have been key aspects of the study in order 
to explore the nature of the various discourses. The concept and methodology of 
discourse analysis are discussed further in section 3.3, Data analysis and 
interpretation. 
 
3.1 Background research 
Collecting relevant secondary data was the first stage of the research, in order to 
provide a foundation for primary data production. Firstly, documents and reports 
describing OfD, in particular the environmental policies which OfD have 
implemented or planned in Ghana, were studied. Background information about 
Ghana’s coastal and marine environment was then collected in addition to data on the 
more general environmental impacts of the oil extraction industry, including examples 
from other areas with a longer history of extraction, such as Nigeria. Using purposive 
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sampling, secondary data was examined revealing different discourses on the OfD 
programme in Ghana and on development aid in general. These texts are from media-, 
official-, and academic sources and the variation in these different genres of text 
provides an interesting contrast in rhetoric and social context. 
 
3.2 Primary data production 
	  
3.2.1 Semi-structured interviews 
The main source of primary data has been semi-structured interviews. This method 
enables the interviewer to use predetermined questions as guidelines, while at the 
same time allowing for a more conversational manner than with a structured 
interview, in order to explore important topics further (Longhurst, 2010). It is seen as 
an alternative approach to realist interviewing, which is more concerned with 
uncovering facts and truths, and it rather views the interview data collected as 
accessing various discourses and narratives through which people describe their 
worlds (Holstein & Gubrium, 1995, 1997, in Silverman, 2003). This is therefore of 
benefit when carrying out discourse analysis at a later stage. 
 
To develop the interview guide, the secondary data was studied in detail in order to 
develop appropriate questions which would provide knowledge of the informants 
discursive position at that time. The interview guide was structured so as to begin 
with questions which are easy to answer and gradually moving towards more in-depth 
questions which need a more personal insight (Longhurst, 2010). 
 
Issues of ethics such as anonymity and confidentiality are central when using 
interviews, as are both the researcher’s positionality, and what may be described as 
the informant’s and researcher’s statuses and roles. A person’s status is their formal 
rights and duties, for example rules and instructions on how a person should behave in 
a specific job. Their role is then the more informal rules and expectations which 
affects how a person chooses to behave on the basis of their status (Aase and 
Fossåskaret, 2007). Positionality may be defined as the way our own experiences, 
beliefs and social location affect the way we understand the world and go about 
	   33	  
researching it (Aitken and Valentine, 2006). These issues are discussed in section 
3.2.4, Ethics and positionality. 
3.2.2 Choice of informants 
The informants who were chosen to be interviewed are all involved in, or have been 
directly involved in OfD’s work in Ghana. The first informant contacted was a 
representative from Norad who was directly involved in the programme’s work in 
Ghana and has worked there for a number of years. From him, the names of several 
other informants from the NEA and the MoE who had been directly involved in the 
programme’s environmental pillar in Ghana were obtained. Through communication 
with these, I was led to the representatives from these two institutions that were 
thought to have the most information on the research topic. From these three first 
interviews in Oslo, the names of two further informants who were involved in OfD’s 
environmental pillar were suggested and these were later contacted and interviewed. 
This process is known as snowball sampling, defined as picking up some subjects 
who feature the necessary characteristics and through their recommendations, finding 
other subjects with the same characteristics (Gobo, 2004). 
 
Many attempts were also made to contact some key actors working with the 
programme on the Ghanaian side, also partly through snowball sampling, and with 
Ghanaian NGOs, but this proved to be challenging. The informants I spoke to seemed 
reluctant to give me any information without first talking to their superiors, who were 
unavailable at the time. I was advised by these informants to send emails directly to 
their superiors, but these were never answered. Ideally, and possibly in a larger study, 
on-site fieldwork in Ghana would also have been carried out in order to obtain more 
and potentially different discourses. This was not possible in this study, however, due 
to family circumstances, as described in the introduction. The primary and secondary 
data produced in the research, though, has provided a depth of material to work with 
and has shown a variety of views and interpretations of OfD’s environmental 
management work in Ghana. 
3.2.3 The interview process 
Three of the semi-structured interviews were carried out in Oslo and two in Bergen. 
There were in total six informants, all male, and the interviews took place at their 
office or in a meeting room at the institution they represented. All of the informants 
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said that they had busy schedules, but they managed to find time for the interview 
quite quickly after I had contacted them, and none of them seemed rushed or 
distracted during the interview itself. The security at the sites in Oslo, in particular at 
the MoE but also at the NEA and Norad, was strict and having cleared security, I 
waited in reception until the informant came to collect me. The sites in Bergen were 
more informal and I phoned the informants in person on my arrival, who then met me 
and took me to the meeting area. Despite these differences, the atmosphere during all 
of the interviews themselves was experienced as friendly and relaxed. 
 
The informants described their role in the OfD programme in Ghana first and then 
gave their responses to my questions. My first impression was that some of these 
responses appeared to be personal views or experiences and others more 
representative of the discourse of their institution. Some informants appeared to be 
concerned that they were giving me information I had already received from others, 
so I had to point out several times that their information was of interest and it was 
their personal experiences and viewpoints on the programme and Ghana that I was 
interested in. In some cases, informants began providing information before the 
interview had formally started and seemed eager to describe their part in OfD’s work. 
At times I felt it necessary to interrupt these so as to bring the subject back to issues 
that were more relevant to my study, this due to the one hour time limit that was 
agreed upon. Others seemed more cautious and obviously curious about what aspects 
of the programme I was interested in. These interviews had a more ‘question and 
answer’ format, at least during the early part of the interview, mostly becoming more 
informal throughout the hour. 
 
The interviews were recorded on a digital recorder, with consent from the informants. 
This is beneficial since it is more accurate than relying on our memory of a 
conversation and it can be replayed for detailed analysis of language and possible 
roles or statuses adopted throughout the interview. In addition, it enables us to analyse 
sequences rather than single sentences or phrases, which is vital for making sense of 
conversation (Silverman, 2003). It is then, considerably more appropriate to carry out 
detailed discourse analysis of transcripts than of notes taken during an interview, 
although various notes made on first impressions there and then were also included in 
the analysis. 
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I also attended a two-day workshop in Bergen focused on Ghana’s oil industry and 
which included participants from Ghana. This provided a wealth of information and 
an indication as to different discourses from the various presentations and informal 
conversations with participants. In this situation I did not use an interview guide, but 
rather asked more general questions about OfD in Ghana and followed up with more 
intuitive questions. 
3.2.4 Ethics and positionality 
Research ethics, including the researcher’s behaviour and responsibilities, if the 
methods used are just, and the role of the research in pursuit of social change, are 
issues to be considered in all types of research (Dowling, 2010). In Norway, the 
Norwegian data protection official for research (NSD) provide guidelines regarding 
confidentiality and ethics, which were followed throughout the study. This included 
reporting the theme of the project and intended methods of data collection and storage 
for approval before commencing fieldwork. The informants received an information 
sheet describing the project and asking their permission to be interviewed, including 
use of their names, and all consented to this. Despite this, I decided at a later stage to 
use anonymity, rather using the name of the institution they represent, this because I 
could not see that their names would add necessary data to the research. The 
informants did not appear to react negatively to their names being used, so I do not 
think that their answers would have been significantly different had they known that 
their information would be anonymous. They were nonetheless representing their 
respective institutions. 
 
Positionality, being how people view the world from different embodied locations 
(England, 2006), is an important aspect of qualitative research in general but 
particularly important when working with discourse analysis. This includes both how 
a researcher views others, and how they are viewed by others. One aspect of this is in 
relation to our social status: our gender, age, class, race and so on. All of the 
informants from the semi-structured interviews were men, somewhat older than me, 
and white Norwegians. My positionality or status, as a younger, female, English, 
master-student may have influenced their roles as older, professional, male 
Norwegians. Although familiar with Norwegian culture, having lived here for over a 
decade, there were some aspects of the Norwegian system and culture which were 
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explained in a greater amount of detail than perhaps necessary, but I did not 
experience this, nor communication in the Norwegian language, as a hindrance. 
 
Our experiences, history and background shape our understandings of the world and 
the knowledge we produce (England, 2006) and I was particularly aware throughout 
the research process of my interests and background in environmental science. Aase 
and Fossåskaret (2007) discuss status and role expectations in, for example, an 
interview situation and that it is important to be aware of both your own status as well 
as the status of the informant. I considered my status and how I could be perceived as 
an ‘environmentalist’ by the informants due to my background. This awareness and 
analysis of oneself as a researcher, also known as ‘reflexivity’ (England, 2006), was 
then of great importance. MacKian (2010) argues that we begin analysing and 
interpreting from the very start of our planning process, so reflexivity should be 
included throughout the entire research process. As part of this reflexivity, I kept a 
notebook which included ideas about the research and my role in it, in addition to 
observations and collected data, throughout the entire research process. This is 
recommended as part of an ethical review of the research undertaken, as well as being 
useful as a part of the discussion of our positionality (Dowling, 2010). 
 
Dowling (2010) describes what she calls power relations in research, an example 
being an informant and researcher having an asymmetrical relationship, or significant 
differences in social positions between the two. The opposite is reciprocal 
relationships where the researcher and informant are in comparable social positions. 
In the case of this study, the relationship was asymmetrical to varying degrees, due to 
myself being a student and those interviewed being professionals. This was somewhat 
noticeable during the interviews with MoE and particularly Norad, where the 
informants were in positions of considerable influence, when compared to the 
researcher. Again, it is important for the researcher to use critical reflexivity, taking 
matters of power relations into the analysis. 
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3.3 Data analysis and interpretation 
3.3.1 The methodology of discourse analysis 
The concept of discourse has been introduced in the previous chapter, while this 
section will discuss the methodology of carrying out a discourse analysis. There are 
many branches of discourse analysis, but the one deemed most appropriate for 
geographical studies of this nature is poststructuralist discourse analysis, often 
associated with Foucault. For Foucault, discourse refers more broadly to the totality 
of utterances, actions and events which constitute a given field or topic (Wylie, 2006). 
He refers to them as the rules and structures that underpin and govern statements that 
are produced, that these statements have common elements which has a unifying 
effect, and that they indeed have a real effect on the world (Waitt, 2010). This may be 
related to the concept of ‘policy discourses’ and the hegemonic depth and extent of a 
discourse, discussed in the previous chapter. Dittmer (2010) describes 
poststructuralist discourse analysis as using a more normatively neutral perspective of 
ideologies, this when compared to other branches such as Marxist discourse analysis, 
and I deemed this as being important in an academic research project of this type.  
 
Using discourse analysis, interpreting data is a two-stage process, often described as 
double hermeneutic, as the researcher must interpret an informant’s interpretation of 
reality (Aase and Fossåskaret, 2007). If we agree that all data is produced or 
constructed, then it is vital also when analysing and interpreting interviews and texts 
to be aware of our positionality. One does not, therefore, provide a ‘truth’ at the end 
of the research, but rather a situated reading of life’s phenomena (Dittmer, 2010) 
 
Foucault feared that a methodological template would become too formulaic and 
reductionist, and so discourse analysis is often thought to be better carried out 
somewhat intuitively (Waitt, 2010). There are, however, guidelines developed in the 
field of social science, and geography specifically, which I have chosen to use in this 
study. Fairclough (2003) describes three prongs of discourse analysis as, firstly, the 
text itself, related to the rhetoric used. Secondly, the ‘discursive practice’ including 
the immediate context in which the discourse is employed, or its production, 
distribution and consumption, and thirdly ‘social practice’ including larger ideologies 
in which the social context is located. 
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When analysing the text itself, there are many tools within the fields of rhetoric and 
semiotics which are of help. Aase and Fossåskaret (2007) provide a detailed toolbox 
for carrying out text analysis including the analysis of symbols with attached 
connotations which are used to describe things, and the use and analysis of structural 
metaphors. An example of the use of these tools is the following excerpt, from an 
article in the Financial Times newspaper about Norwegian petroleum aid. 
 
‘But the Norwegians have little to show for their efforts around the world so far. São 
Tomé, which sought Norway's help in 2005, has been criticized for its shaky and 
opaque start to awarding its oil fields and Nigeria's situation has worsened’ (Hoyos, 
2006). 
 
This may be compared to Erik Solheim’s introduction in the annual Oil for 
Development report from 2010. 
 
‘The programme takes a broad approach to petroleum sector management, covering 
the management of resources as well as of revenues and the environment. All our 
efforts are informed by principles of good governance such as transparency and 
accountability.’ (Norad, 2011). 
 
Taking the word ‘opaque’ as a symbol with a negative connotation and as the 
dichotomy of ‘transparent’, and similarly ‘shaky’ as a symbol with a negative 
connotation which may be viewed in contrast to the positive connotation of the 
symbol, ‘accountable’, one can begin to analyse the texts and gain more 
understanding of the different discourses and narratives used about Norway’s 
petroleum aid. 
 
As part of ‘discourse practice’, identifying the status of the author or respondent 
(stakeholder analysis) is an important part of the process and the situating of the data 
according to their status (Aase and Fossåskaret, 2007). This also includes an analysis 
of the intended use of the discourse, its audience and its circulation. In the example 
given above, one could comment on the statuses of the authors respectively, as female 
and male, journalist and politician, British and Norwegian, and how this affects the 
rhetoric in their texts or responses. 
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When moving from text analysis to broader social context, the challenge is to connect 
the data set to the broader realm of geographical practice (Dittmer, 2010). Aase and 
Fossåskaret (2007) suggest that the context an individual places a phenomenon in can 
also be described as which cognitive categories they place an observation in, and how 
they relate these to other categories. They state that data is an observation plus a 
category or concept and by overlooking this contextual knowledge, which can be both 
historical and cultural, the meaning of an individual’s comment or text can be 
distorted or, at worst, absent. Through the analysis, I have attempted to gain 
knowledge of such local contexts or categories through the texts and interviews. 
 
The concepts and theories discussed in Chapter 2 also provide tools as to how to make 
the ‘jump’ from the text and discourse practice to social practice, this being the third 
branch of Fairclough’s system. Using a political ecology perspective, this includes 
how discourses may become sedimented and reproduced, becoming ‘policy 
discourses’ and how these reflect larger ideologies. By including the wider 
discussions surrounding the resource curse, development aid, and environmental 
management, it is possible to locate the social practice at different scales within which 
the discourses are located.  
3.3.2 Transcribing and translation of the interviews 
The interviews were transcribed in full from the audio recordings, including pauses, 
emphasized words and phrases, laughter and other behaviour which was taken note 
of, and could be used in identifying and describing a discourse. The transcribing 
process was useful as I became aware of certain details that were not noted during the 
interviews. The transcriptions were then translated from Norwegian to English. I 
carried out the translations myself, being fluent in both languages and, again, the 
process was useful in becoming familiar with the texts. Translation was challenging at 
times due to a number of Norwegian idioms used in the interviews. In the text 
excerpts chosen for the analysis, however, I am satisfied that the texts have not lost 
any significant detail from their original meaning through the translation process. In 
addition, during the interviews, I used or repeated some of the key words and phrases 
from the OfD programme such as ‘capacity building’ and ‘good governance’ in 
English so as to be certain of the intended meaning.  
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3.3.3 Coding 
Having transcribed and translated the interviews, I had become very familiar with the 
texts, but used a system of coding, which is the process of identifying and organising 
themes in qualitative data (Cope, 2010). This aided in finding and categorising 
excerpts that related to different aspects of the research. There were some areas that I 
had previously deemed important, but which were later regarded as less relevant 
having analysed the extent of the material. This included some of the more technical 
environmental monitoring data. Other aspects emerged as very central to the research 
questions, often through the recurrence of certain codes, some of these not having 
been previously considered. The text was marked with the chosen codes in order to 
aid in analysis and sorting. These codes, firstly, represented a particular theme such as 
‘environmental impact of oil’ or ‘corruption’ and, secondly, frequently repeated 
expressions such as ‘personal opinion’ or ‘assistance’, or often repeated topics, in 
order to comment on trends within the texts. Inconsistencies were also coded. 
3.3.4 Choosing texts and excerpts 
A diversity of texts were chosen for the study because they contributed to identifying 
the different discourses, this being purposive sampling. Text excerpts that contributed 
to identifying and describing the motives behind these different discourses were also 
highlighted, in addition to excerpts that related to a specific theme deemed relevant to 
the research. These texts are from both primary and secondary sources, since primary 
data production was limited to Norway and I was reliant on Internet sources to 
identify further discourses. 
The study has included several different types of texts and genres based on the 
concept of intertextuality, the assumption that meanings are produced as a series of 
relationships between texts, rather than residing within the text itself (Waitt, 2010). 
Intertextuality includes the presence of elements of other texts within a text, or 
quotations (Fairclough, 2003). This has provided the opportunity of interpreting 
discourses which were not obtained through primary data production, since the texts 
which were analysed contained aspects of other texts. It is important to be aware of 
the genre of a text using this method, since the producer of each genre is addressing a 
particular audience and the background of the author, text and place must be 
researched to form an interpretation (Waitt, 2010).  
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3.4 Reflections and limitations of the methodology  
When using the concept of intertextuality and analysing reproduced discourses, it is 
important to consider that the author of a text’s own discourse will have coloured the 
text itself. It may to a large extent come down to claims from the author that what is 
reported has actually been said. As part of this process one must continuously analyse 
the reliability and validity of data collected or produced, particularly secondary data. 
Some organisations’ websites, for example, may have a very obvious discourse, while 
others are more discreet, but in both cases it is important to double check any facts 
and figures which have been used in certain ways to portray their specific discourses.  
 
The study has used a relatively small number of interviews, and texts, but with a lot of 
detail, or intensive qualitative research. The research might have gained an interesting 
angle with the carrying out of on-site fieldwork in Ghana, and this is something I 
hope to carry out at a later stage. This produces primary data through what Aase and 
Fossåskaret (2007) describe as participating observation: to be situated in the 
fieldwork over a period of time, which creates a unique insight into the research. This 
could also have included more biological and environmental data as part of a larger 
project perhaps, in addition to interviews and observation. 
 
Again, it is important to consider that the results of the research do not provide a 
‘truth’ as such, but rather the situated description of an issue, as is the case with all 
forms of qualitative research. The results are not less useful, however, and may be 
generalised and transferred to other studies. 
 
3.5 Generalization and transferability 
The total number of samples used in qualitative research is often not large enough to 
be representative of a group or population and the methods of collection are often not 
random, such as those used in quantitative research. The knowledge about processes 
occurring gained through qualitative research can be generalized and transferred to 
other similar studies, a process known as ‘transferability’ or ‘generalization’. Gobo 
(2004) describes this as generalizing about the nature of processes occurring rather 
than quantifying results. Baxter (2010) describes generalization in qualitative research 
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as being achieved by carefully selecting cases and creating theory which is neither too 
abstract nor too case specific. This theory may then be tested to see if it applies in 
other cases. 
 
This study has used purposive sampling, carried out by analysing OfD’s own 
environmental discourse, along with the discourses of critics of OfD and petroleum-
related aid. There are also middle positions which criticize certain aspects of the 
programme while praising others. An analysis of the relationship between the 
structures influencing policies and actions has been carried out and by analysing these 
variables, rather than quantifying the features, it is possible to generalize about 
general structures and relationships, which may then be transferred to other studies 
(Gobo, 2004). The study does not, therefore, use generalizing phrases such as ‘most 
believe that…’ but rather describes trends and patterns in the discourses. Examples of 
research that these knowledges may be transferred to are, studies focused on other 
aspects of the OfD programme and its collaborators, or further research on 
environmental management in Ghana in general, related to the oil industry or 
otherwise. It could also be transferred to research on more political issues of 
petroleum-related aid, and Norway and Ghana’s political systems and governance. 
3.5.1 Validity 
Poststructuralist thinking has challenged the assumption of a single truth and therefore 
certain claims to knowledge, making the validity of quantitative research in this field 
a debated topic (Mansvelt and Berg, 2010). The concepts of generalization and 
transferability described above, however, are common methods used to assess the 
validity of qualitative research. In addition to these, Jackson (1985) in Dittmer (2010) 
argues for the importance of a focus on the logic of connections claimed by the 
researcher, this being a method of assessing the validity of the analysis. Also, research 
may be deemed valid by those outside the intended audience, to see if others 
recognize the discourses found by the researcher (Dittmer, 2010). This has occurred 
throughout this research process through supervisor consultations and discussions 
with other students, including those belonging to different fields of research. 
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4. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
This chapter is an analysis of the data produced from interviews, policy-, assessment- 
and evaluation documents obtained from informants, and secondary sources, using the 
methods described in the previous chapter. It will firstly identify the discourses being 
used about OfD, drawing together similarities and highlighting differences between 
these where possible. It will then highlight specific areas in the discourses regarding 
OfD’s environmental management in Ghana, which relate to the research questions 
and thus provide an indication as to the wider nature of the programme and its impact. 
 
4.1 The discourses 
Two main discourses used about OfD’s environmental management in Ghana have 
been identified, having carried out a discourse analysis of the interviews and official 
documents. In addition, a number of other discourses arose during data production, 
covering different aspects of the environmental impact of oil in Ghana from both 
primary and secondary sources. Categorising the discourses which emerged through 
the interview process was challenging. There were many similarities in the discourses, 
in part because all of those formally interviewed were involved directly with the 
programme from the Norwegian side, therefore having a paid role in OfD. They also 
had similar backgrounds, as discussed in the methodology chapter, being Norwegian 
males of similar age and social status. There were, however, certain distinctions 
which allowed differentiation between what I have named the Norwegian 
development discourse (NDD) and the Professional partnership discourse (PPD). 
These discourses will first be described, outlining what defines them, their intended 
use and who is using them. This will include a discussion of the roles and statuses of 
the informants and their motives for using the specific discourses. The study then 
turns to specific significant aspects of OfD’s environmental programme in Ghana, 
which arose from the data production, discussing the different discourses and 
narratives used within each theme. 
4.1.1 The Norwegian development discourse 
The main institution using the NDD is Norad, but aspects of it have also been 
identified in the other interviews. Those using this discourse have as their goal the 
promotion of the OfD programme and to some extent a Norwegian model. They are 
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interested in gaining support for OfD in order to gain continued financing of their 
work with the programme. Their audience is the general public, from local levels of 
civil society to levels of governance, both in Norway and potential partner countries, 
making the discourse accessible at an international level. The discourse is circulated 
through the media, and through private and public meetings such as interviews and 
reports. Their motives for promoting the NDD are based on their roles and statuses as 
part of the OfD programme in Norway. All of the actors interviewed using this 
discourse are Norwegian and directly connected to the programme. The deeper lying 
motives for OfD’s programme as a whole are discussed in sections 4.2.7, Statoil and 
Norwegian investments and 5.1.3,	  Norway’s motives for its aid programmes. 
 
One example of Norad’s use of this discourse is the four-minute long video on their 
website entitled, ‘Norwegian oil expertise is sought after’ (Norsk oljekunnskap er 
ettertraktet) (Norad, 2014).  This describes OfD’s work in Ghana using expressions 
such as that Norway’s help is ‘extremely sought after’ and it shows interviews in 
which informants claim that OfD has been ‘God sent’. It describes Ghana’s oil 
industry in a positive light with claims such as, ‘Most people in Ghana are waiting 
impatiently to partake in their oil wealth’, therefore generalising about a population, 
while silencing the view of groups who do not experience oil in this light. It may be 
described as a commercial for OfD, which uses the framing of an issue to gain public 
support. 
 
The NDD can be distinguished from others in the interviews and collected documents 
by formulations used which portray a specific attitude about OfD and aid programmes 
in general. One such aspect is that foreign aid is deemed necessary for development of 
the environmental sector in poorer countries. 
 
“As is quite common, directorates are pretty well staffed and well-trained, have some 
resources, partly because they are sponsored by foreign donors [laughs], even before 
we come into the picture” (Informant, Norad). 
 
This statement refers to directorates in Ghana, and in other countries that the 
informant has experienced through his work, having a greater capacity than the 
ministries because the directorates are often the target of foreign aid, rather than the 
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ministries. This very much suggests the necessity of foreign aid in capacity building. 
In Ghana, the EPA had received foreign aid prior to OfD’s involvement, from the 
World Bank, Denmark and the Netherlands, and the informant describes OfD as, 
“supporting the forces of good that already existed there”, in part due to this aid 
which was previously given. These “forces of good” are seen as being a direct result 
of foreign aid. MESTI had not been targeted by these aid programmes before OfD 
came into the picture and was described by the informant as “relatively weak” in part 
due to the lack of foreign aid aimed at this institution. OfD chose to “work” directly 
through the ministry since it was “where policy-making took place”, an area deemed 
important in the OfD programme and according to Norad’s informant, “we have given 
them legitimacy and authority” and in general “strengthened the ministry”. 
 
The words “weak” and “strong” are symbols with very obvious negative and positive 
connotations and are being used here in relation to pre- and post-development aid, 
giving an insight into the way OfD and development aid in general is viewed by the 
informant. Also, the use of the phrase “we have given them”, rather than ‘helped’ or 
‘assisted’ them, implies that the ministry had a great need which OfD was generous 
enough to respond to, implying an asymmetrical relationship. This may be seen in 
relation to the concept of a ‘gift’ in the context of development aid, which creates a 
debt to the donor (Nustad, 2003). The word “work”, which is used on several 
occasions by the informant, for example “Before we started work in Ghana (…)”, 
suggests the category that the relationship is placed in, and that Norway has a ‘job’ to 
do there. This also implies Norway being in a position of power in Ghana. 
 
Norad’s informant explained that he has worked for over 20 years with aid and 
development in over seven different countries and that “There is no Norwegian aid 
programme that is so popular and in demand as OfD.” He describes how Norway’s 
experiences “May contribute to making their everyday life a little better.” The words 
and phrases, “popular”, “in demand” and “making everyday life a little better” are 
symbols with clearly very positive connotations in regard to the OfD programme’s 
work. The latter has something of an overtone of superiority, or what Tvedt (2009) 
would categorise as coming from the ‘national do-gooder’s regime’, also described as 
Norway’s execution of power through aid in relation to the receiving country. Tvedt 
also describes Norway’s intentional shift in foreign policy from missionary work to 
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‘normatively neutral’ aid, but expressions such as ‘God sent’ and “forces of good” 
may more resemble the rhetoric of the former.  
 
Other aspects that define the NDD are the use of words and phrases such as “capacity 
building”, “competence building” and “expertise”. These occur relatively often 
throughout many of the interviews and form key focus points in OfD’s work. The 
terms form a part of OfD’s ‘good governance’ concept, which is used widely by 
development aid organisations on a global scale, as discussed in Chapter 2. It is 
described by Norad as being ‘cross-cutting and essential’(Norad, 2012b, p.9).  
 
An example is given in this summary of OfD’s work in Ghana related to 
environmental management, using a fairly common formulation found in the NDD. 
 
“You could say that the point of this co-operation is to conduct competence 
development in Ghana, and in counsel, based on Norwegian experiences, about the 
challenges they face” (Informant, MoE). 
 
This indicates a co-operation between the giving and receiving countries in order to 
develop capacity to handle development challenges. This co-operation may be seen in 
relation to the discourse of using a ‘participatory’ approach to development, as 
described in the concept of ‘new aid architecture’ (Sande Lie, 2011). OfD’s strategies 
are described as being based on “Norwegian experience”, a term very central in the 
NDD. 
 
“[What is] unique for OfD is that there are not very many others who can offer the 
same experience as we can. What we do is that we offer Norwegian experiences, we 
don’t export a Norwegian model, which you can just copy. We pass on our 
experiences then we try to adapt them with the partner country (…)” (Informant, 
Norad). 
 
When asked what some of these adaptions were, the informant explained that it was 
the Norwegian ministries and directorates that have this experience and that they pass 
them on to their partners in the receiving country. The NEA passes on their 
experiences with environmental management of oil to the EPA Ghana, for example. 
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The technical co-operation lies, therefore, with these institutions. The NDD is quick 
to deny the exporting of a “Norwegian model”, instead using “Norwegian 
experience”, and insist that the programme is adapted to their partner country. The 
informants from IMR, however, describe using the Norwegian model through OfD’s 
work in Angola. 
 
“We had some training work in Angola for some years too, and used the Norwegian 
model more directly there. Then we saw that not everything worked equally well in 
Africa as here at home and it had to be adapted a little. (…) In Ghana I would say 
there are lots of good things and some are a bit more difficult, as we have gradually 
become aware of!” (Informant, IMR). 
The distinction between the Norwegian ‘model’ and ‘experience’ is somewhat 
unclear. The Norwegian model in oil production as described by Thurber et al. (2011) 
comprises three distinct government bodies: a national oil company (NOC) engaged 
in commercial hydrocarbon operations, a government ministry to help set policy, and 
a regulatory body to provide oversight and technical expertise. Norway’s oil 
‘experience’ is very much based on this model and therefore constitutes the bulk of 
OfD’s suggestions to its partner countries. Solli (2011) argues that OfD is based on 
Norwegian experience but many oil exporting countries, including Ghana, are not in 
the same position, politically or economically, as Norway was during its early 
extraction period in the 1970s, in addition to changes in international regulations and 
standards. In both cases, “adaptions” are required, a word which is used frequently in 
the NDD, and which is contained in both the quotes above, although specific details 
about these adaptions were hard to come by in this discourse. 
The informant from Norad described the goals of OfD as firstly having legislation, 
structure, and appointed responsibility in place in the partner country, secondly that 
they have the competence, capacity and people to follow this through, and thirdly that 
these authorities are held responsible by civil society, the media and others. He feels 
that the first two points are in place in Ghana, whilst the third point has been to a large 
extent covered by other aid agencies such as the World Bank. These goals, which are 
often described and unified by the term ‘good governance’ are repeated in many of 
Norad’s reports and in other Norwegian development programmes and appear to 
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constitute the ‘master plan’ for development used in the NDD. The goals can be said 
to be based on Norway’s own experience from its oil industry but also show great 
similarities to modern international guidelines for development aid, for example those 
used in the World Bank’s development discourse. 
 
The NDD may be generalised into the ‘new aid architecture’ concept due to the 
rhetoric describing a participatory approach, rather than a top-down approach based 
on conditionality. It is based on the concept of good governance, with the discourse’s 
definition of this including participation from civil society. This reflects the World 
Bank’s development discourse, and is in line with the definition of new aid 
architecture. The extent to which the discourse can be described as ‘developmentality’ 
as used by Sande Lie (2011), where this ‘freedom’ is framed by the donor’s objectives 
and standards in order to make policies hegemonic, will be discussed throughout this 
and the following chapter. 
4.1.2 The professional partnership discourse 
The discourse used by informants who have worked with more practical aspects of the 
OfD programme’s environmental pillar is somewhat different to the NDD. Those 
using this discourse are not directly employed by OfD, but are professionals within 
their field and referred to as ‘external consultants’, being contracted for a period of 
time by the programme. They do not have the same motives for promoting the 
programme as the NDD, but are nonetheless cautious in their criticisms of it, stressing 
that these criticisms are very much their own “personal opinions” or “experiences”. 
Their audience is smaller than that of the NDD, perhaps being limited to interviews 
with researchers and other public or private meetings about the programme. This may 
be at local, national or international levels, but with less of a span than the NDD due 
to these actors seemingly having less motive for its promotion through media and 
other sources. The actors may, all the same, have personal motives for their discourse 
about OfD, related to their own social, political and economic embeddedness and 
their roles and statuses as professional, Norwegian men. Their livelihoods are not 
dependent on the programme, but while they are contracted, they receive payment for 
their work with it, an aspect that may influence their discourse.  
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Goldman (2001) describes the role of professionals in development plans as being 
vital to the aid organisation’s master-plan and that the process of ‘green development 
knowledge’, overlaps with processes of professionalism. His argument describes a 
framing of environmental issues, which compels participation in a global 
environmental governing process. The analysis of the PPD will therefore incorporate 
this argument and examine the extent to which these actors frame environmental 
issues, silencing other discourses. 
 
In general, the collaboration between Norway and Ghana is described in a different 
manner, using more moderate formulations, and being perhaps more reflective and 
based on personal experiences than the NDD. One example is the word “assist” being 
used a great deal by the informant from Bergen municipality. 
 
“[OfD in Ghana] is based on assisting the authorities in every way related to the fact 
that they have discovered oil and (…) to assist with everything, really, that Norway 
has experience with” (Informant, Bergen Municipality). 
 
“Assisting the authorities” may be compared to the NDD’s, “giving the authorities 
what they need”. The term implies a more symmetrical relationship and although 
“assist” may be used in a similar way to ‘aid’, ‘give’ and ‘help’, the interpretation of 
the context in which it was used, placed the relationship between the two countries in 
a different category than that of the NDD. 
 
The PPD describes “working alongside professionals” from Ghana, in contrast to the 
NDD which gives more an impression of having to ‘teach’ the Ghanaians what they 
need to know. 
 
“By being able to play a role, which is partly a professional role alongside 
professionals from Ghana, is very interesting because we have different experiences, 
and to some extent different backgrounds and so on, so we can play ball” (Informant, 
Bergen Municipality). 
 
The expression “play ball” conjures images of a ball being passed back and forth 
between players, a metaphor for a game, but also implying a joint venture in which 
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ideas are passed back and forth between participants. This suggests a symmetrical 
power relationship. It also portrays the process in a more light-hearted manner, 
suggesting a good ‘sporty’ relationship or friendship between participants. 
 
One informant describes the problem-solving process where he poses questions based 
on his experiences in the field, to open for discussion with Ghanaian professionals. 
When asked about the decision-making process, he remarked, “I would never go 
there and say that this is how it should be done”. The formulations used in this 
discourse portray a mutual co-operation and work-projects alongside equals, rather 
than the more asymmetrical relationship which at times shone through the NDD. 
 
The informant from NEA describes his role in the process of  “needs assessments”, 
including a workshop with his “Ghanaian equivalents” at the EPA, and that 
Norwegian consultants were “made available (…) just to get a grip on the issues and 
challenges facing Ghana.” The expression “needs assessment”, also described by the 
informant from MoE, implies an inclusive approach, particularly when the Ghanaian 
institutions were involved throughout the entire process. Also, the term “Ghanaian 
equivalents” being similar to “working alongside professionals”, places the co-
operation in a different category from the NDD. 
 
“We started meeting in 2008 and talked for maybe a couple of years before we got the 
answer to what was needed to be done in Ghana. (…) We arranged something called 
a ‘needs assessment workshop’, and this was something that we chose to do because 
we didn’t feel that we got very far with just talking to people. They said ‘we know 
there are plenty of challenges related to the oil and gas industry, but we do not know 
what to ask for of aid from Norway, and we do not know what your competence is’, in 
a way. So it was very liberating that they said [this], because we realized that we had 
to approach things more systematically and in a way unfold: What is it that this oil 
business can create of challenges and opportunities in the area of environment? And 
then we tried to explain this, in a setting where there were many Norwegian 
institutions involved and the corresponding Ghanaian institutions, so that these 
institutions could meet their opposite number and have professional discussions about 
their needs. Out of this came a report that defined these needs and this was used as 
the basis for this agreement” (Informant, MoE). 
	   51	  
 
“Professional discussions” are also mentioned here, in addition to phrases such as 
“institutions meeting their opposite number”, this referring to a ‘twinning’ process, 
for example between the EPA Ghana and Klif, and MESTI and MoE. This points to a 
more equal power relation, and the entire needs-assessment process is described as 
being carried out in a very humble, cautious manner. Perhaps the discourse even 
describes the approach as being ‘too cautious’, since it took over two years before the 
Ghanaian authorities said that they did not know what to ask for. 
 
In general, formulations used in the PPD are more modest and open-minded in many 
ways, and these actors categorise their roles in the context of a two-way equal 
partnership. They do not appear to have the need to ‘sell’ their product in the same 
way as the NDD, but speak, all the same, largely positively about their own work with 
the programme. There are, however, similarities between the two discourses in that 
they both support the general idea of OfD and development aid and portray the 
sharing of the ‘Norwegian experience’ in a very positive light. 
 
4.2 Key themes in the discourses 
Described below are some of the key themes regarding OfD’s environmental 
programme in Ghana, which emerged from the interviews that were carried out in 
particular, and also from the various documents which have been studied. Some 
secondary sources have also been used to illustrate the different discourses within 
each theme. The themes have been highlighted because they were deemed important 
aspects in relation to the theme of the study either by myself, or by an informant, and 
provide answers to the specific research questions. 
4.2.1. Strategies used in OfD’s environmental pillar in Ghana 
Norad’s reports describe OfD’s environmental pillar in Ghana as being steered by a 
committee of ministries, in particular the MoE, with key implementing institutions 
such as NEA and the Norwegian coastal authority (NCA) in the area of environmental 
protection. In addition, it has a range of consultancies, research institutions, 
international organizations and civil society groups which are involved in the 
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programme’s implementation. Its main focus is, however, at the national level, with 
MESTI being a main target, as previously described. 
 
It was explained by the informant from Norad how the programme was normally 
categorised into four parts or ‘pillars’: resource management, environmental 
management, safety, and revenue management, and although the focus of this 
research was the environmental pillar in OfD’s programme, it was impossible to 
detach that from the programme as a whole. 
 
“In a society there are no islands that work really well or badly while the rest works 
entirely differently. So it is very much related to both the general structure and 
attitudes in society” (Informant, Norad). 
 
“Islands” is used as a metaphor for the different pillars of OfD, and that the general 
structure and attitudes in a society will shape the outcome of the programme as a 
whole, and therefore the outcome of each pillar. This may be interpreted as the ‘will’ 
and ‘ability’ of a country to succeed, a topic which is discussed by many of the 
informants as being an important factor in the success of OfD’s programme. In this 
respect, there is a reference to place-specificity in both discourses, but rather than 
suggesting adaptions, the NDD describes placing the result of the programme to a 
large degree in the hands of the receiving country, depending on its will and ability to 
succeed. 
 
From the interviews and Norad’s reports, there were three main initiatives which were 
included under the environmental pillar in OfD’s programme, which started out quite 
early, even before the OfD agreement was fully in place. The first was the Dr Fridtjof 
Nansen baseline research, which was conducted in Ghanaian waters. The second was 
a SEA of the oil industry and the third was the Western Region Spatial Development 
Framework (WRSDF), a land-use planning strategy. Interviews were carried out with 
key actors involved in all of these three initiatives. 
 
The Dr Fridtjof Nansen research cruises took baseline samples prior to oil production 
in 2009, and then three years later to compare the results in order to identify 
biological and chemical changes. Samples were taken both from the sea-floor and 
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water column along transects running from the coastline and in to deep-water where 
the oilrigs are situated. This was a co-operation between Norwegian and Ghanaian 
institutions and scientists, organised by the Norwegian IMR. The work got underway 
early on, due to the boat being in the area on other business, so the baseline samples 
were taken before oil production started up. The boat discovered, amongst other 
things, a live coral reef which was the first of its kind to be discovered in Ghana, in 
addition to discoveries about the direction of the ocean currents, which have great 
implications for the oil industry’s pollution control. The concentration of pollutants 
such as hydrocarbons and metals found in the 2009 samples was described as 
generally low in the study report (IMR, 2010). The results of the second cruise sample 
analysis are not yet available. 
 
The development of the SEA for the oil and gas sector was described as a long 
process, with its roots in several other plans, drafts and needs-assessments. This was a 
co-operation between private consultants, the MoE Norway and several institutions in 
Ghana, including the EPA and MESTI. The object of the SEA in Ghana is described 
as, ‘The formalised, systematic and comprehensive process of evaluating the 
environmental effects of policy, plan or programme and its alternatives, including the 
preparation of a written report on the findings of that evaluation, and using the 
findings in publicly accountable decision-making’ (SEA, 2013 p.8). The SEA, which 
was given to me by the informant from MoE, uses the term ‘environment’ to include 
not only the physical environment but also social, cultural, micro-economic and 
institutional conditions that constitute the human habitat. It therefore refers to 
environmental ‘risks’ and ‘opportunities’ throughout the assessment and 
recommendations. In defining the word ‘environment’, the report suggests an 
appreciation of the concept being socially constructed and therefore an approach to 
the study more in line with modern political ecology in this respect. 
 
Lastly, a land-use planning project, the WRSDF is very much related to infrastructure 
development and urban growth due to the oil industry. The project is a co-operation 
between the Danish COWI, OfD, and the Town and Country Planning Department 
(TCPD) and MESTI in Ghana. Its goal is, ‘to provide policy direction on how the 
region’s space economy should develop over the next 20 years (…) and provides a 
platform for integrating social, economic, infrastructure and environmental 
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developments’ (TCPD, 2009). Its main focus points are settlement patterns, economic 
activity areas, environmental management and infrastructure development. In the area 
of environmental management, it stresses the need for environmental and social 
impact assessments, various limits and controls on emissions and the preservation of 
culture and traditions in the region.  
 
In addition to these three main projects, there have been training programmes, 
workshops and various visits to and from Ghana by OfD participants in order to aid in 
developing legislation and build capacity and expertise. In particular, twinning 
between Klif and EPA Ghana has been highlighted in an evaluation of OfD as being 
particularly successful (Norad, 2012a). 
4.2.2 Ghana’s starting-point seen in relation to the resource curse hypothesis 
A central question that was posed in the interviews was based on resource curse 
literature, which commonly suggests that the necessary institutions need to be in place 
prior to oil production starting up, in order to avoid the impacts associated with a 
resource curse. Was this the case in Ghana? In every interview, the answer was no, 
these were not in place before oil production started, this in part due to the short space 
of time between oil discovery and production start. Some believed that Ghana had 
done a good job with establishing a legal framework, and with capacity building, 
whilst others thought that the process had been far too slow. The informants described 
their opinions about Ghana’s starting-point in general, this giving an indication of 
what initiatives would be necessary to improve the country’s environmental 
management. The informants sometimes compared Ghana’s starting-point to that of 
other oil-producing countries, this mostly portraying Ghana in a positive light. 
 
Some informants believed, however, that Ghana had an “undeserved good 
reputation”, possibly because it was an English-speaking country, which made 
communication easier with aid institutions when compared to other, non-English 
speaking, African countries. They also thought that the environmental authorities 
were too passive and did not have the active role they should and that Ghana was 
actually “not as functional” as they thought beforehand. Most, however, believed that 
Ghana had a relatively good starting-point compared to many other African countries. 
The EPA was particularly mentioned as being unusually effective. 
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“It was not the case that everything was in place before oil production got started, 
since they made the findings and managed to start production in the Jubilee Field in 
two years, I think. (…) It went really quickly, so the institutions weren’t in place. (…) 
But if one is to speak of environmental management, the starting-point in Ghana was 
particularly good in the sense that you had the EPA Ghana, which had a fairly high 
standing. We don’t see this in many countries we work with, where environmental 
management is fairly bad. We started simply on another level in our collaboration 
with Ghana than we have done in other countries” (Informant, NEA). 
 
Capacity building was named as a key factor in OfD’s work in Ghana. Most believed 
that Ghana had a relatively “weak” starting-point, in terms of their administrative 
system and a weaker system of implementation, when compared to Norwegian 
conditions. Regarding the question of the right institutions being in place one 
informant stated, “It’s clear that a regulatory framework is a passive thing as long as 
you do not manage it”. Considering the tone used while making this comment, it was 
interpreted to mean that a focus on capacity building was vital, rather than the 
development of further regulatory documents, which has been very much a focus of 
other aspects of OfD’s environmental work. In general, those using the PPD were of 
the opinion that Ghana did not have sufficient capacity to handle all of this 
‘paperwork’ being developed, this suggesting the need for more of an emphasis on the 
second part of OfD’s programme, ‘competence, capacity and people’ to carry out 
their work. 
 
The terms ‘good’ and ‘bad’, ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ were used frequently during the 
interviews when describing Ghana’s starting-point. Some informants pointed out that 
this was their personal view or opinion, whilst others suggested that this was just the 
way things were. The NDD tended towards the latter, whilst in the PPD, it was 
specified that the terms were used based on the actor’s own experiences. The NDD 
could be seen as using these terms in order to defend their aid programme as a whole, 
and specific strategies within it, while the PPD may have less of an agenda. 
 
There was some disagreement as to how “accommodating” Ghana was, in terms of 
people being able to express their views and opinions, this being an aspect often 
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included in ‘good governance’ definitions. One informant believed they were quite 
liberal in this area. 
 
“It seems like a country that is reasonably accommodating, compared to many other 
countries you go to, where you almost don’t dare to say what you really think. So 
there should be hope for Ghana really!” (Informant, NEA). 
 
Other informants described Ghana as having a layer of well-educated elite that did 
very well, while at the same time, a much less effective system existed beneath them 
containing workers who did not dare to voice their views. Many important issues did 
not, therefore, reach the surface due to poor communication between these different 
social layers. The elite were often those who were publicly visible from outside their 
institutions and this was described in the PPD as showing the world a “glossy picture 
of themselves”. The EPA Ghana and other institutions involved in OfD in Ghana were 
said to follow this pattern. 
 
“You have these middle-managers under the layer of top-elite, which slow-down 
processes because things have to go through them and there’s a very poor 
communication flow. (…) They are very bound on what they have the authority to do 
and (…) they say nothing in the presence of their boss because they are afraid of 
saying something wrong. There’s no flow of information and it’s a bit scary really” 
(Informant, IMR). 
 
This portrays a slightly different discourse, revealing issues of power and authority 
within the Ghanaian institutions. “Poor flows of communication” and being “afraid” 
and “bound on what they have the authority to do” have negative connotations and 
symbolise a ‘restriction’ in being able to make their views heard. This discourse gives 
the impression of an area that needs working on in order to achieve a more efficient 
environmental management system and better governance. It is also consistent with 
my experiences in attempting to interview Ghanaian actors, where I was informed that 
I would have to talk to their ‘bosses’ at the various institutions. It is, however, in 
contrast to the “strong” EPA that the NDD gave the impression of. Some may have 
given this impression of strength based on the “glossy picture” which Ghana is said 
to export of its well-educated elite. Others may have had other motives for implying 
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the EPA’s strength in their discourse. A leader at the EPA Ghana who had been 
educated in Trondheim in petroleum technology, was mentioned in the context of how 
this put Ghana in a much better position than many other countries OfD had co-
operated with. This may be seen as implying that the EPA was ‘strong’ due to 
Norway’s superior education programme in petroleum technology. There was also 
reference to the number of employees as being a factor in its strength, suggesting a 
more quantitative evaluation. 
 
Another aspect to be considered is the social, cultural and political structure in Ghana 
being different to that of Norway. The hierarchy of power described as existing in 
institutions such as the EPA may be ascribed to Ghana’s political history. Whitfield 
(2010) describes Ghanaian politicians as having a history of being suspicious of civil 
servants’ loyalty, and that incentive structures within the civil service actively 
discourage initiative and proactivity. She also describes the frustration of civil 
servants as being underpaid compared to domestic or donor-funded consultants, and 
as being bypassed when ministers appoint political advisers to get things done. The 
economic decline of the 1970s also led to an exodus of professionals, and acquiring or 
retaining good staff continues to be a problem today. Whitfield argues that as a result 
of these factors, Ghanaian bureaucracy may delay or halt implementation. 
 
OfD’s training workshops, such as those run by PETRAD, are very much focused on 
competence building with the elite from different institutions, according to some 
informants, whilst the real focus should be more on those working on the ground 
within different aspects of the petroleum industry. The PPD suggests more capacity 
building at a lower level, in order to be able to implement and ‘handle’ all of the 
policies being made. This argument would agree with Whitfield’s analysis of Ghana’s 
political history. 
 
“PETRAD comes and trains these top bureaucrats and people higher up in the 
system, but what they need is technical training and experience building for people 
who can work with more practical things, and then they can also include the locals 
here. (…) It’s more basic education at a very practical level that is important” 
(Informant, IMR). 
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The informant from Norad, however, argues for the programme’s focus at a macro 
level, or what could be described as focussing on the elite. He describes, 
“emphasizing the ministry since that’s where policy-making is” and that it was 
therefore important that they had the “expertise” and “capacity” to carry out their 
role. According to the analysis in Whitfield (2010), the factors influencing 
government policy-making in Ghana were shaped by what the political and 
bureaucratic elite found desirable and perceived to be feasible, and by their authority 
and ability to get those actions implemented. This suggests a somewhat undemocratic 
use of power, an aspect which OfD may or may not have considered in its macro-
level focus.  
 
Regarding the issue of corruption, which was not included in the interview guide, but 
brought up by the informants themselves when talking about Ghana’s starting-point, 
there were a number of different discourses, and what can be described as hesitancy 
and silences were noted during some of the interviews. 
 
“Corruption is a serious factor in many African countries but I would say that, we 
have not noticed at least, not that I have myself experienced, or heard of others who 
have had problems with corruption, in relation to our co-operation with OfD” 
(Informant, MoE). 
 
Reasons given for this absence were that OfD does not involve much direct financial 
aid, but rather pays the wages for the hours the Norwegian partners have worked. The 
amount of actual capital that Ghana received through OfD was described as 
“insignificant”. Although the actual figures were not mentioned, the amount may be 
seen as insignificant in relation to the revenues that oil itself generates. 
 
Corruption was described as an “opposing force” to Ghana’s work with capacity 
building. 
 
“You can see what has happened in Norway, the process of building up from nothing, 
an administration and an instrument for dealing with the oil industry. So you see that 
they have a huge challenge. Their starting-point is much weaker. And it must happen 
quickly, they have to be powerful, they must have a legal capacity, right? They must 
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be able to implement what they want, implement decisions. And there are opposing 
forces; from the chiefs, there is corruption everywhere. I mean, yes, Ghana’s very 
democratic and all, but I think that corruption is, in many areas, carried out so that... 
You don’t know of course who is corrupt, you do not know how much the government 
is corrupt, who is corrupt there and who is corrupt elsewhere, but you hear about it 
all the time. There are many considerations to be taken. And it is clear that this is a 
counterforce which can be very destructive” (Informant, Bergen municipality). 
 
The informant uses very strong formulations and symbols in this excerpt, such as the 
view that one must be “powerful” in order to overcome “destructive counterforces”. 
The “powerful” that he refers to is based on a strong democratic legal system, which 
holds actors accountable, such as the system in operation in Norway. He refers to time 
as being an important issue: things needed to happen “quickly” this agreeing very 
much with resource curse theory that the right institutions and legislation need to be 
in place preferably before production starts up. He did not mention whether he 
personally had experienced corruption in relation to OfD, in contrast to the informant 
from MoE, who made it very clear that he had not, but suggested that you “heard 
about it all the time”, and that it was a hidden or disguised process that you never 
quite knew where was occurring. 
 
Regarding Ghana’s starting-point for its oil industry, the topic of the mining 
industry’s environmental impact and “learning from past mistakes” was brought up 
during the interviews. I was told by some informants that private individuals and 
groups were responsible for most of the environmental damage, which has been 
widely reported, rather than the larger mining companies who had gradually 
introduced more environmentally sound practices. Much of the mining that uses 
damaging techniques, such as the use of cyanide and arsenic to extract gold, had 
apparently been done without permission from the authorities, and was therefore 
beyond their grasp when it came to environmental regulation. This phenomenon is 
known as ‘Galamsey mining’. 
 
The NDD contained mainly positive rhetoric about Norwegian investments in the 
mining industry in Ghana, and that these were very focused on environmental and 
social impacts. There was no mention of lack of environmental regulation in this 
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sector. The PPD described “serious environmental problems” from gold mining 
activities during the period prior to increased corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
focus, and which had yet to be cleared up. Although the larger companies were now 
“more cautious” they did not have the necessary systems for handling discharge from 
the industry and the piles of waste from earlier periods were still polluting ground-
water and rivers, according to this discourse. 
 
The connections between the oil and mining industries regarding lack of regulation, 
and the mining industry’s environmental impact, did not appear to be relevant to the 
Ghanaian people, according to these discourses. Their optimism over their oil find 
was still huge. The PPD suggested creating more links and better communication 
between the oil and mining industries, however, in order to improve both sectors. 
 
An evaluation report of OfD often uses Ghana as an exception to the general trends in 
OfD’s work. It is described as the ‘best performing country’ of OfD’s core countries 
(Bolivia, Ghana, Mozambique, Uganda and Timor-Leste) and ‘best in class’ and ‘the 
most positive exception’ to various governance problems reported in other countries 
(Norad, 2012a p.24). This implies that its starting-point was much better than that of 
other countries, agreeing with the views of the majority of my informants. 
 
There was a reference to Ghana’s enormous national focus and consciousness about 
their oil industry; that this was their big chance and they were going to get it right. 
This was described as being a factor that would contribute to their success in both 
discourses. Some informants described the actual people and “national feeling” or 
“pride” and that they had a “willingness to succeed”. There were references to lack of 
religious and political conflicts and that the level of basic education was reasonably 
good, despite them not having practical expertise in many aspects of work with the oil 
industry.  
 
The fact that Ghana has a varied economy was also given as a reason for them having 
a better chance of avoiding a resource curse. These views may again be seen as place-
specific factors, which influence the programme’s success. There was general 
agreement, therefore, in both discourses, that Ghana’s starting-point was better than 
many other African countries OfD has worked with, which meant that their ‘job’ was 
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easier and that it had a reasonably good chance of avoiding a resource curse, despite 
things not being in place before production started up. 
4.2.3 Norway as an oil nation 
According to the NDD, the way in which Ghanaians view Norway as an oil nation is 
very positive and its successes are widely known. 
 
“Everyone speaks very warmly about Norway and recognises Norway as a relatively 
successful oil nation. It is something that everyone is aware of, and we might well be 
that. After a while, though, we haven’t only done wise things either. (…) If you ask the 
average Ghanaian about what they know about Norway he says, ‘Oh yes, you have oil 
just like us and you’ve been very competent, or lucky, in managing it, and we will be 
too’” (Informant, Norad). 
 
This attitude on the part of Ghana, according to the discourse, formed the basis of the 
collaboration between the two countries, as they sought contact with Norway after the 
discovery of oil in order to gain from their expertise in the field. The use of the word 
“everyone” gives the impression of there being a global agreement regarding 
Norway’s “success”. The framing of this issue is a typical trait of the NDD, which 
silences other discourses about Norway, for example, debates about oil reliance in 
Norway, and the country’s role in global issues such as climate change. 
 
The PPD summarise Norway’s history as an oil nation and why these experiences 
may be useful for other countries developing their oil industry. 
 
“Norway is in the situation that we have an offshore oil industry which is very 
important for Norway and we have fisheries that are also important, [and have been 
since] before oil discovery. And we have been running an oil business for 40 years, so 
the experiences we have, where we made some mistakes and we have done some 
things that have been more correct, so there has been some trial and error, but at 
least in some areas we have come up with a system for environmental monitoring 
which works quite well. Also it is very important to have a regulatory framework as a 
foundation that oil companies must adhere to. (…) This puts pressure on the 
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companies in that they must be very restrictive in what they do (…). And these 
experiences we have from Norway, we feel may be useful for other countries.” 
A second informant adds, “The first time I was out in the North Sea in the 90’s, it was 
a pretty messy affair in some of these fields and what we see in Norway is that they 
have taken hold of these problems and gone from situations in which oil companies 
argue and push the consultancy companies to get them to change their results and 
things, to that this has become part of their daily routine. [In Ghana] they are up and 
running and getting all this started” (Informants, IMR). 
 
Both the discourses then, admit that Norway has made mistakes in the past, but 
through a long process, has managed to create a good system of management, which 
may be shared with receiving countries. The PPD includes an ‘admittance’ to issues 
of corruption in Norway in the past, with oil companies “pushing” the consultancy 
companies to change their results. There was much discussion about current 
Norwegian policy with its operating oil companies and many believed that this 
‘model’ was also the way forward for Ghana in its environmental management of oil. 
 
“We believed it was important that the EPA Ghana quickly entered into a dialogue 
with the industry so that they realized the need for them to do surveillance of the area 
and influence the petroleum industry. Make agreements about this. This is the way 
things are in Norway: The polluter pays. And we offered them insight on how we do it 
in Norway when it comes to this monitoring offshore and helped to draft this in 
Ghana. (…) In Norway we just say, ‘No it is not our problem. It’s you who has an 
operation here, we have set the conditions; that this operation will take place within 
this and this emission limit, and regarding the impact on nature. You must prove to us 
that this is so.’ And this is the only way forward” (Informant, NEA). 
 
These aspects of Norwegian policy, with regard to the polluter pays principle and 
monitoring responsibilities applying to the operating oil companies through a national 
plan, were described in the PPD as one of, if not the, most important aspect to focus 
on in Ghana’s environmental policy. This could be described as a direct exportation 
of the Norwegian oil model. The term, “the only way forward” leaves little room for 
discussion or ‘adaptions’ and could be interpreted as the Norwegian way is the only 
way, in this issue. This comes back to the fine line between exporting the Norwegian 
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model versus Norwegian experience, but both discourses gave the impression that 
Ghana should adopt this aspect of Norwegian policy. 
 
According to the evaluation report of OfD, the Norwegian model was considered to 
be the ‘golden standard’ by many, therefore having a very positive connotation to 
many of those involved in the programme (Norad, 2012a). Many of those interviewed 
for the report had also stated that they had asked for Norwegian assistance based on 
this model and were free to reject it if they chose to. The report portrays a very strong 
argument for this aspect of the programme: that it is free, the co-operating countries 
have chosen it themselves, and that they are ‘free to reject’ aspects of it. The report 
includes a wide range and number of informants and data from both countries, so that 
the general findings from this source regarding critique of Norway exporting its own 
model are overwhelmingly positive. 
 
In this respect, the NDD, regarding the export of the Norwegian experience, has 
become hegemonic, with both Norwegian and Ghanaian actors praising the 
optionality and non-conditionality of the programme. How ‘free’ Ghana actually is to 
reject aspects of the programme, however, and the extent to which the co-operation is 
a symmetrical partnership will be further examined. 
4.2.4 The role of the oil companies 
Communication and the content of the agreements between the Ghanaian authorities 
and the operating oil companies, was a topic that was much discussed in the 
interviews. There was talk of responsibilities in terms of environmental monitoring 
and oil contingency plans, and suggestions that the oil companies operating in Ghana 
should be, at this monitoring stage, financing environmental sampling and analysis. 
These ideas are very much influenced by Norwegian policy, as discussed in the 
section above. It was reported by actors using the PPD that the EPA Ghana seemed to 
feel that they themselves were responsible for environmental monitoring and had 
planned on developing a large, complex and very expensive laboratory for this 
purpose. The EPA had also wanted to continue using the Dr Fridtjof Nansen research 
ship for further sampling but had been advised against this by several actors working 
under OfD, who stressed that this was not their responsibility but that of the oil 
companies.  
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“We told them, because they wanted the Nansen to take further samples and make 
analyses for basic research down there. We said that we advised the EPA Ghana, for 
one thing, we did not want to give aid for this, for the second, we did not feel that this 
was a public task (…). They have probably gone a bit far in getting aid to continue 
with things that we believe are the industry’s responsibility” (Informant, NEA). 
 
This was obviously an area with an unresolved potential and a certain amount of 
disagreement between the two countries. It was also brought up as an extremely 
important and central area of OfD’s work in Ghana, through the drafting of 
agreements and national plans in order to monitor the industry’s self-financed 
analyses. This disagreement is further discussed in section 4.2.5,	  The co-operation 
between the Ghanaian and Norwegian authorities. 
 
When asked if they had any direct contact with the oil companies operating in Ghana, 
all of the informants replied that they had very little or no direct contact, but picked 
up information from and about them through other sources, such as the EPA Ghana. 
Communication between the oil companies and the authorities was described by the 
PPD as being relatively good in Norway, less so in Ghana. 
 
“The communication with the oil companies, I think, is one of the things that has gone 
quite well here in Norway. We have a close dialogue with them and, for example, 
when it comes to environmental monitoring, the oil companies are represented in the 
group making plans for the monitoring together with the Norwegian authorities. I feel 
that in Africa in general, the industry is on one hand and the government on the other 
and communication between them is not as good as it could be” (Informant, IMR). 
 
Regarding the oil companies’ responsibility in Ghana, it was suggested that the 
companies had the main responsibility in oil contingency plans, for example in the 
case of an oil spill, as in the Norwegian model. In the area of surveying and analysing 
though, it tended to vary from country to country. 
 
“In a country like Ghana, they have… I do not know the details of exactly how far 
their responsibility goes, but the government has to make sure that someone is doing 
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everything, to put it that way, either they or the oil companies. And that will have an 
impact on licensing and things. But in Ghana it’s relatively tidy” (Informant, Norad). 
 
The government, “making sure that someone is doing everything” refers again to the 
need for a national plan and the defining of roles. Although the appointing of 
responsibilities is contained in OfD’s ‘master plan’, it appears to be an area that 
remains unresolved, and also one which contains disagreements between the two 
countries. According to the PPD, this was far from “tidy”, as several other excerpts in 
this section will show. Regarding a national plan and the responsibilities of the oil 
companies, it was stressed that this was not in place in Ghana. 
 
“They have not quite managed to systematize things, so they have sent people out to 
assist the oil industry in making their own plans but haven’t really seen the value of 
creating a national plan that everyone has to follow. I think that is maybe the most 
important thing to work with (IMR informant). 
 
The NDD suggested that the oil companies preferred to operate in a predictable 
environment, since that was what they were used to from Norway.  
 
“[The oil companies] say that the great thing about having Norway in a country like 
this [Ghana], to the extent that the Norwegian experience has an impact, the oil 
companies will face a regime that they are familiar with already. Because the 
Norwegian model is also used, or... Norwegian management principles are used in 
many other countries too, and that the oil companies therefore know well, both in the 
developed world and in the not so developed, so the more people who use it the 
happier they are. They are not happy because they know that the tax rate will 
probably be higher too and so on, but for them, for an oil company, it is much more 
important that there is predictability, orderliness, absence of corruption, this is much 
more important than whether they pay 54-55 per cent tax really” (Informant, Norad). 
 
This portrays the oil industry, and particularly Norway, in a very positive manner, 
again using symbols with positive connotations such as “familiarity”, 
“predictability” and “orderliness”, similar to the word “tidy”, which is used several 
times by the same informant. The PPD, however, described the oil companies as 
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trying to get away with looser controls in this area if they were able to do so. One 
explained that the same oil companies in Ghana are also operating in the North Sea. 
 
“They live very well with our requirements [in Norway], they are almost expected to 
get them down there too and if they don’t then they see their chance to get away with 
things in a fairly straightforward way” (Informant, NEA). 
 
The expression, “get away with things”, can be seen very much as a contrast to the 
previous excerpt’s portrayal of an orderly and predictable system, instead evoking 
more an impression of “untidiness” and even “chaos” in the relationship between the 
authorities and the oil companies. Much literature on oil suggests that corporate 
altruism is rare and shortcuts and corrupt practices are common (e.g. Maass, 2010, 
Bridge and Le Billon, 2013, Logan and McNeish, 2012). This has also been the case 
in Norway’s not so distant past, according to the PPD. 
 
There also arose some conflicting stories about Tullow, the main oil company 
operating in Ghana. Tullow’s own discourse, available from their many reports and 
which I have named the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) discourse, claims that, 
‘We are committed to protecting the environment for current and future generations 
as well as ensuring our local communities, employees and suppliers are kept safe and 
well. We also work to prevent major accidents at our facilities through strong safety 
processes’ (Tullow Oil, 2014 p.57). This rhetorically implies sustainability, in its 
inclusion of  ‘future generations’, in addition to including ‘local communities’, as 
expected in regard to CSR discourses. Safety is also included in connection with 
environmental concerns, as is often the case in oil contingency plans. This discourse 
categorises its environmental policies as ‘tidy’ and ‘orderly’, in much the same way 
as the NDD described the oil companies’ policies in Ghana. 
 
The informant from MoE reported that they had had some contact with Tullow, but 
mainly through the EPA Ghana. He spoke of the EPA setting more demands for the 
oil companies in the area of environmental management and research, which were 
costly procedures that the EPA would eventually benefit from. The process had not 
been without its problems, however. 
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[This communication] appears to be a bit problematic. At first it was actually pretty 
easy, but there were some changes in personnel and so on, in the oil companies, that 
made it all a bit more difficult, and that combined with a slightly cautious attitude 
from the environmental authorities in Ghana. So here there is an unresolved potential 
which one should absolutely grasp” (Informant, MoE). 
 
The words and expressions, “problematic”, “bit more difficult”, “slightly cautious 
attitude” and “unresolved potential” are symbols with negative connotations and 
seem to point to an area where OfD has not succeeded in its plan as hoped. Despite 
these ‘problems’, however, the informant describes Tullow as being a “relatively 
small new company, but have had a huge success in the countries they operate in.” 
This can be seen in contrast to the narrative used by others about Tullow. 
 
“Tullow have had some trouble round and about in Africa, but they enter into so 
many difficult areas. They were chased out of East Africa; Kenya, or some place 
where they had some activity. The locals didn’t get work and there was only foreign 
labour and eventually there were so many demonstrations and riots that they had to 
leave the area. They struggle with that in Ghana too, they expressed that themselves” 
(Informant, IMR). 
 
Being “chased out” and being the cause of “demonstrations and riots” are in strong 
contrast to the implications of a “huge success”. It is possible that the informant from 
MoE was implying economic success, but this was not specified in the interview. It is 
also possible that he was unaware of these issues. 
 
Another issue also arose in the PPD relating to the oil companies’ responsibilities, 
which varies greatly from the NDD referring to this as being “relatively tidy”. The 
dialogue describes an oil company spill-response plan and highlights an important 
issue regarding the responsibilities of oil companies and the authorities in Ghana. 
 
“One of the things that scared me when I saw one of these oil spill response plans for 
Ghana was that some of those beaches where the fishermen live, a few thousand 
fishermen, they have their houses, they prepare the catch, they have all their daily 
needs, they wash themselves in the sea and in the rivers that run from it, there’s 
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training, and schools, it’s all taking place in this beach area! And then there were 
probably some engineers from the oil companies that ran some models and calculated 
that x number of tons of oil could reach the beach there and then we need ten 
bulldozers, and 30 large trucks and then we can scrape it up and drive it away, so we 
can handle so and so much oil on the beach. And then they forgot that 3 or 5 thousand 
people live along the beach. And their houses and everything are there. If you were to 
follow the plan that they have there, that means that absolutely everything is just 
bulldozed away from the beach. 
And then I asked, ‘What about the people who live here, will they have to be moved 
and things?’ And I got, ‘This is the authorities’ responsibility’, and that it was the 
Directorate for Civil Emergency or something that would make plans on how to 
evacuate people and then accommodate them. It was not the oil company's job. They 
have to clean up the beach, while the authorities were responsible for taking care of 
the people who lived there. And this is then a huge gap in the system which is not in 
place. (…)And this has been approved by the government who say that they will take 
care of the second bit, but they have not really begun working on it, I believe. It is 
quite typical that they do not have local knowledge, they have sort of just looked at 
the technical models and quantities of oil” (Informant, IMR). 
 
I was told that the government had approved this plan as it was, despite the IMR’s 
objections being communicated, and that the plan had been developed by Tullow. The 
narrative here portrays a very obvious gap in Ghana’s environmental and social 
management policies, which the OfD programme does not seem to have been able to 
cover, in that they do not have any direct contact with the oil companies. This 
narrative agrees with that of the NEA and literature on the politics of oil, which 
describes the oil companies as “trying to get away with things”, if they have the 
chance to do so. It is therefore in strong contrast to the ‘CSR discourse’ that Tullow 
themselves circulate, and with the NDD. In addition, the narrative also points out the 
lack of efficient government regulation, since the authorities are said to have 
approved the plan. This is an area which OfD should be able to influence through 
their support of the ministries, and through the drafting of national environmental 
policies, but the PPD claims that the authorities had not listened to their advice on the 
matter. This supports the view that Ghanaian authorities are ‘free to reject’ aspects of 
the programme. Perhaps in this case it was due to the potential effect on licences, as 
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suggested by Norad’s informant. In terms of Ghana’s environmental governance, 
however, this is indeed a “huge gap in the system” that should filled before a larger 
oil spill occurs. 
 
The PPD argued that the passing of a national plan was vital to Ghana’s success in 
environmental management of the oil sector. The system they suggested, based on the 
Norwegian model/experience, was that a national plan should oversee the 
environmental monitoring and analyses that the oil companies carried out, otherwise 
the oil companies would be able to create their own environmental guidelines, as in 
the example of the contingency plan given above. 
 
“What we see is that the oil companies have these company policies for environment 
that they follow. But I think it is very important that there is a national plan for 
environmental monitoring (…) so that they build up expertise in Ghana and have a set 
of rules that environmental research shall be conducted according to a standard that 
they themselves define” (Informant, IMR). 
 
The “standard that they define” again suggests a non-conditional and optional 
agreement and that the Ghanaian authorities should be in charge. They argue the 
importance of this control, in particular, now that a number of new companies were 
entering the equation from China and India, amongst other countries. Since the 
companies are largely free to create their own CSR and environmental policies, they 
apparently had some “weird parameters” in their proposals for monitoring, in 
addition to some important parameters that were omitted. They gave the example of 
an oil company plan from Angola that had omitted mercury and several important 
heavy metals from their list of chemical parameters which, “looked very impressive 
since it had so incredibly many other parameters, but if you looked at it a little 
critically, there was good reason to question it” (Informant, IMR). 
 
In general then, there was agreement in both discourses that the oil companies should 
have the financial and practical responsibility for environmental monitoring, rather 
than the EPA Ghana, whilst a national plan should oversee the procedures and set 
their own environmental standards, which the oil companies should adhere to. Whilst 
the NDD described the relationship between the oil companies and authorities in 
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Ghana as “tidy” and “nothing to worry about”, the PPD described the oil companies 
as trying to get away with whatever they could if they had the chance, and provided 
examples of this in the various proposals that IMR had the opportunity of studying. 
This section has also shown that Ghana has chosen to ‘reject’ aspects of the 
programme in its refusal to listen to IMR’s advice, and is therefore not bound on this 
matter, at first glance. 
4.2.5 The co-operation between the Ghanaian and Norwegian authorities  
There were a number of interesting discourses which gradually came to light through 
the interviews about the nature of the collaboration between the authorities in the two 
countries. The NDD describes how the OfD programme was “extremely sought after” 
and popular and that the authorities were very grateful for the aid, advice and 
assistance. The PPD also, to a large degree, describes a good co-operation between 
Ghana and Norway during the work that these actors carried out under the OfD 
programme, and that they had received feedback from Ghana that their work had been 
helpful. 
 
“Yes, we have always had a very good relationship with them and the senior 
management there has always supported the collaboration in a very positive way. And 
it is also the case that Norway has, in a way, become the leading country in co-
operation with Ghana in the area of oil, both in the environmental and resource 
areas. So we feel that we have a responsibility, and that does not mean that others are 
not in picture, but that happens often under the direction of the co-operation that 
Norway and Ghana has” (Informant, MoE). 
 
The informant here refers only to the “senior management”, agreeing somewhat with 
the claims that the ‘layer of elite’ receives the capacity building and expertise. 
Although agreeing that much of the collaboration had been “well-received” and 
“helpful”, a different discourse also emerged from the IMR and NEA: that there was 
actually a certain amount of conflict regarding, in particular, the purchase of 
laboratory equipment and, also, the use of the Dr Fridtjof Nansen research ship. It was 
inferred that funding for the analyses from the research cruise was being withheld as a 
kind of protest about the EPA’s behaviour in this issue. The informant from Norad 
told a different story as to why the tests had not been analysed. 
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“Part of the point here is that it is not Norway that should do this. This is something 
we help Ghana to do. It’s the Ghanaian universities and institutions that are involved, 
and do these analyses. Some of it must be done in Norway because laboratory 
capacity is not so good in Ghana, but it is part of the development process” 
(Informant, Norad). 
 
When asked about the Ghanaian reluctance to return the Nansen ship, the informant 
explained that the ship was used in many countries but it did return to Ghana 
eventually, and described the process as being very “neat and orderly.” This can be 
seen in contrast to the comment of another informant:  
 
“There’s been some cleaning up to do after this on the Ghanaian side, with regards to 
this thing with Fridtjof Nansen and their desire to use the programme further for 
monitoring and not just for basic research” (Informant, NEA). 
 
The expression “neat and orderly” being a symbol with a positive connotation, may 
be seen in contrast to “cleaning up”, a metaphor referring to something dirty or 
broken, which needs to be fixed. The informant from NEA explains in detail about 
these disagreements between the Norwegian and Ghanaian authorities. 
 
“They wanted to keep sailing, basically, when they saw their chance to do so, but they 
were stopped en route. So the research was conducted but the analysis was not done, 
and they have been withheld until the embassy opens up the money and pays for the 
analysis. But it must be underlined that you do not do that kind of thing again!” 
(Informant, NEA). 
 
This was based on an agreement between the actors on the Norwegian side of the co-
operation, that since things had gone in to a monitoring phase, beyond the baseline 
research that OfD funded, the oil companies should finance further research. As 
previously discussed, this is very much based on Norway’s own model which the 
various Norwegian actors from OfD had advised Ghana to follow. The development 
of a high-tech laboratory, as previously mentioned, was also a topic that had 
obviously caused some friction between OfD and Ghana, in particular the EPA. OfD 
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had advised against the lab, since both development and running costs and 
requirements were described as being “enormous” and “unrealistic”. Again here, 
according to Norwegian policy and advice, it was not the EPA’s responsibility to do 
further sampling and analyses, but that of the oil companies. Nonetheless, the EPA 
had received aid for the development of this lab from the World Bank, ignoring the 
advice given. This is also contradictory to the claim that most aid “comes under the 
direction of the collaboration between OfD and Ghana”, as quoted above. 
 
"What we've seen is that [the EPA] go out and buy the most expensive items that exist 
of analytical instruments, for many millions of dollars, and we know that they will not 
get them up and going because it is too advanced. There are horrendous operating 
costs involved, and there need to be lots of people with expertise to keep it running 
properly, they think that if they buy the most expensive items one can find in the 
world, (…) and other equipment that we barely have here in Norway, this is what they 
ordered, with funding from the World Bank. And we have said that you are never 
going to get this going! And then we are looked upon as if we do not have confidence 
in them, almost like we’re racist. We have advanced equipment but we do not wish the 
same for them. But we know that there are special requirements for the buildings 
where they’ll install the equipment, and for power supply; there is a tremendous 
power usage and they have an unstable power supply in Ghana (…). The power goes 
twice a day, so you’ll never get operational” (Informant, IMR). 
 
The tone of this excerpt was somewhat aggressive regarding this matter. The same 
informants describe other technical and financial difficulties with the EPA building 
their planned laboratory, such as the heat produced from the instruments, energy use 
and building adaptions, which were neither planned nor budgeted for. The informant 
from the NEA reported that Norway had “been strict with them” on this matter, but 
that they could not force Ghana to do or not do anything either. He believes that the 
EPA’s plans for the laboratory are to make them look, “strong” and give them more 
the impression of “authority”, but that it was a “false dream”, for many of the same 
practical and financial reasons given by the IMR informants. The PPD portray the 
EPA as being stubborn and uninformed in this matter. The EPA apparently regarded 
OfD as “racist” and believed that OfD “do not have confidence in them”, apparently 
not wishing for Ghana what Norway has. 
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The inclusion of race in the discourse may almost be seen as having a colonial 
overtone in that white people from a rich country are accused of not wishing the same 
for Ghana as they have themselves. The reasons for OfD’s objections to the 
laboratory at this time appear to be sensible, however, and Norway’s experiences with 
this matter may have saved Ghana a lot of unnecessary time, effort and money. The 
laboratory being financed by the World Bank, without communication with OfD, was 
obviously a sore point for the Norwegian actors who had advised against it. 
 
These conflicts over the development of a laboratory and use of the Nansen ship were 
central to OfD’s environmental projects. If it is indeed the case that funding for 
analysis of the second set of samples taken from Nansen is withheld in protest at 
Ghana’s behaviour, then the entire Nansen project, given as a central project in OfD’s 
environmental pillar, has had a limited effect on environmental management in 
Ghana. At the time of writing, I have received no information that this issue has been 
resolved. 
 
This section also shows the use of the Foucauldian concepts of power and discipline, 
since Ghana’s unwillingness to comply with the advice of OfD actors, led to it being 
‘punished’; its funds were withheld and “it must be underlined that you do not do that 
kind of thing again!” These issues were silenced entirely in the NDD. Although 
Ghana is free to reject aspects of the programme, this rejection resulted in negative 
consequences regarding the rest of the programme. In this respect, OfD can be said to 
have retained power over the receiving country by using conditionality, although their 
rhetoric states otherwise. This is in accordance with the concepts of 
‘developmentality’ and ‘environmentality’.  
4.2.6 Local participation and knowledge. Ghana specific strategies? 
With civil society participation, local knowledge, and dynamic, place-specific 
strategies being suggested in literature on oil governance, a question in the interview 
guide was related to the inclusion of these perspectives in the programme. The PPD 
described a certain amount of contact with the local population in the area potentially 
affected by the oil industry, including traditional chiefs and fishermen. The narratives 
of the meetings with local actors or stakeholders brought to light a different 
environmentalist discourse. One of these narratives was that the fishermen were their 
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own worst enemies, using damaging techniques such as bottom trawling and the use 
of dynamite to increase their catch. In addition, some of these fishermen reportedly 
blamed the oil industry for the fact that they had to use these techniques because of 
reduced catch. According to the PPD, this reasoning was misguided, and rather based 
on the spreading of an environmentalist discourse, which blamed the oil industry as 
the root of all evil. 
 
“(…) There are actually some organisations from different countries, without 
mentioning any in particular, travelling around and telling everyone that everything 
the oil industry does is terrible, and if there aren’t any fish then it is the oil industry’s 
fault. (…) I feel sometimes that a message is being spread that is not completely 
rooted in reality” (Informant, IMR). 
 
They refer to this environmentalist discourse as a “rhetorical strategy”, and that there 
are many other activities going on along the coast that do much more damage, 
including run-off from farming and uncontrolled land-use. In addition, there is little 
public focus on these other practices since the local, national and international focus 
is on the country’s oil industry. The informant believes that it is unpopular and not 
“politically correct” to argue against this focus. With their background in marine 
research, these informants have a scientific approach to different forms of 
environmental degradation and their view of this ‘anti-oil’ discourse as being 
uninformed is therefore due to their roles and statuses as scientists. A discourse that 
blames the oil industry for ‘all evil’ without scientific data to support it is obviously 
framing the issue, but it is also possible to view IMR’s narrative as being somewhat 
uninformed. It disregards local discourses and narratives without fully investigating 
what their claims are based on, and if there could be any truth in their claims against 
the oil industry. The analyses of the second Nansen ship cruise samples are, after all, 
yet to be carried out. It is also possible to frame scientific information, constructed by 
experts, in order to support different discourses, as argued in the concept of 
‘environmentality’. The “reality” that they speak of is therefore also constructed, as is 
that of the environmentalist discourse they describe. 
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The informant from the land-use planning project talked about the traditional chiefs, 
who were often included in meetings held on different aspects of the oil industry’s 
impact on local areas.  
 
“You have an administration that is structured much like in Europe (…) but at the 
same time you have a traditional governance that are the chiefs who hold (…) a 
substantial authority, particularly over rights to land. And there can arise conflicts of 
interest periodically. They did things rather wisely, so that the chiefs meet in national 
bodies and they are aligned and co-ordinated with the government and parliament. So 
you always consult with the chiefs. (…) And it’s my impression that they have quite an 
influence on policy, nationally, regionally and locally. They’ve been involved in lots 
of workshops out here [under the OfD programme] and in that context, the chiefs are 
always invited along with technical experts” (Informant, Bergen Municipality). 
 
The informant explains how the chiefs also represent coastal areas and local fisheries’ 
interests in such meetings with the authorities and other groups, but describes their 
job as “difficult” due to conflicting interests. On the one hand they want to protect 
their traditional society and on the other they have commercial interests providing 
opportunities related to the oil business. Through such workshops, as described 
above, Goldman (2001) suggests that participants must adopt the rationalities and 
technologies presented to them, so as to speak with expertise, this being a part of the 
concept of environmentality. Although the chiefs and other participants are ‘free’ to 
make their own choices and influence policy, they may, to some extent, also have 
been influenced by the NDD. 
 
Although some aspects of OfD’s environmental programme, such as the land-use 
planning project, have involved chiefs and other civil society groups and individuals, 
Norad’s informant said that OfD did not work directly with local actors and groups, 
but that other organisations were working more at that level. OfD did, however, give 
financial support to several national and international organisations working more ‘on 
the ground’. In 2011 and 2012, these included Revenue Watch (RW) and Publish 
What You Pay (PWYP), organisations working with increasing transparency and 
accountability in transactions carried out relating to the oil industry. Other NGOs 
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receiving the most amount of financial support were the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) 
and the Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) (Norad, 2013). 
 
“It is important that these authorities, those in responsible positions, are held 
responsible by civil society, the media, various watchdogs that exist. OfD aids in this 
process in various countries. In Ghana we have been not very focused on this, from 
the Norwegian side, because when we started, at least when I arrived there in 2009, it 
turned out that there were already many others who were doing it. They have a pretty 
astute civil society and media, who already then in 2009 had access to resources both 
from external donors and some from the government too actually. So there was not 
much need for Norway to step in and contribute as much there. (…) We have involved 
many civil society organizations and the media in these training activities and things, 
but it's sort of a division of labour. The World Bank and others have done much of 
what is called expectation management and public information with the authorities. 
Although we are probably mostly at the higher-levels, working with laws and things 
like that, there are others, both local and international NGO's, for example, working 
more with the population and things like that” (Informant, Norad). 
 
The “watchdogs” described here relate to ‘accountability’, an important aspect of 
good governance, according to the NDD, and this is described as being in relatively 
good shape in Ghana, partly due to the work of other aid organisations such as the 
World Bank. Local participation projects, such as the “training activities” described 
here, may also be more aimed at mobilising community groups than empowering 
them to influence and share control over development (Malena, 2000 in Potter et al., 
2008). 
 
Several informants criticized the co-operation (or lack of it) between fisheries and the 
oil industry, but this issue did not seem to be directly covered by OfD. The Nansen 
research ship worked very much with this issue in other countries, but not as a part of 
OfD.  
 
“What has been insufficient is the establishment of good systems for coexistence 
between fisheries and the oil industries. There is still much to do there and it is 
something that is on the programme here, but which we haven’t been very involved in. 
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In Norway, it’s to a large extent the petroleum directorate that looks at that type of 
problem, and the coastal authorities” (Informant, MoE). 
 
With very obvious links between environmental costs in marine and coastal 
environments and impact on fisheries, this seems a very relevant omission. In Ghana 
specifically, many of those who are, or are at risk of being, directly affected by the oil 
industry, are involved in fisheries along the coast, and have constituted the main civil 
society group who have criticized the oil industry so far. This criticism has come to 
light through meetings and through local NGO’s who report the local communities’ 
concerns. OfD not focusing more attention on this group is, then, a large gap in their 
inclusion of civil society and local knowledge. 
 
From the interviews, some of the specific initiatives used in OfD’s environmental 
management programme in Ghana seemed to have been adjusted to suit Ghana’s 
specific needs. The land-use planning project worked from a geographical perspective 
and included place-specific strategies at different scales. The Nansen research project 
had also developed what they called the ‘Ghana model’, which was created to suit 
Ghana’s specific needs at the time. The SEA and needs-assessment activities were 
collaborations between the two countries, and, although very much based on 
Norwegian environmental policy, the Ghanaian authorities were included throughout 
the entire process. Again, in these processes, it is hard to quantify the extent to which 
the NDD has influenced actors in Ghana, ‘compelling them into restructuring 
institutions, ecosystems and human landscapes’ (Goldman, 2001) in ways that are 
accountable to their discourse. The extent to which the strategies are dynamic is also 
debateable, since the OfD programme is time-limited and is therefore somewhat 
limited in following the industry’s dynamic effects in Ghana. 
 
It was suggested in the PPD that there were initiatives that were not included in the 
programme, which would have been very relevant for Ghana, such as co-operation 
between the oil industry and fisheries, and better communication between the 
authorities and the oil industry. The OfD programme as a whole could, in this respect, 
be criticized for Ghana-specific initiatives that it left out, rather than those it included. 
As stated in the evaluation report of OfD, Norwegian agencies alone may not cover 
the needs on the local-partner side and peer learning may be more relevant than the 
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transfer of a more global knowledge. ‘Regional collaboration and alternative skills 
centres are part of the OfD toolkit - they could be used more’ (Norad, 2012a, p.144). 
4.2.7 Statoil and Norwegian investments 
Conflicts of interest between private and state actors are a common critique of the 
OfD programme, as discussed in Chapter 2. According to a large number of media 
sources and Statoil itself, Statoil bought a share of a Hess-operated licence in Ghana’s 
Jubilee Field in 2012 (Statoil, 2012) but then apparently withdrew, with nothing 
further about the case being mentioned in the media except that ‘Statoil has left 
Ghana about as quickly as it arrived, although the Norwegian oil and gas firm says it 
is still open to investment in the West African country’ (Energy Intelligence group, 
2012). When the question was posed to one informant about Statoil’s involvement in 
Ghana, I was informed that there were not any clear links as yet. 
 
“Statoil has actually considered Ghana for many years (…) and they are still very 
interested, but they have still neither bought themselves shares, that I know of, nor 
been granted any licence. Whether they are still interested in this, you’ll have to ask 
them” (Informant, Norad). 
 
The informant silenced this issue in his discourse, and it seems unlikely that he did 
not know of Statoil’s purchase and sudden exit from the Hess-operated licence. In an 
interview, Nore, the director of OfD, states that ‘I’m a bit tired of rejecting the fact 
that OfD is some kind of conspiracy between Norad and Norwegian commercial 
interests’ (Sæbø, 2010). But tired or not, the accusations will continue as long as 
Norway is involved in ‘questionable dealings abroad’ through Statoil and the 
Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG) (Logan and McNeish, 2012) and the NDD 
silences this issue. 
 
Further on the subject of Norwegian investments in Ghana, it was explained that the 
Norwegian embassy in Ghana, “wore two hats”. 
 
“The embassy administers aid, but at the same time, and this is included in the 
foreign instructions, that (…) Norwegian embassies should facilitate the Norwegian 
business sector. So we have been in contact with Statoil and other Norwegian 
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companies but what they want to report and things is often limited, and that’s fair 
enough!” (Informant, Norad). 
 
It came to light in the PPD that the main consultant in the development of the OfD-
funded SEA for Ghana was a man who had worked over a longer period of time for 
Statoil as environmental consultant. His position in OfD’s work would be categorised 
as ‘external consultant’, according to Norad’s list of contributing actors in OfD. This 
was explained in a casual manner, which did not give the impression of any potential 
conflict of interest. 
 
Norway also has investments in Ghana’s mining industry through the GPFG. The 
fund owns a part of several mining companies operating in Ghana. When asked about 
the environmental degradation which has occurred in connection with the mining 
industry there, the GPFG were described as “very serious investors” in the NDD. 
 
“In this sense, Norway is there indirectly as investors in Ghana. (…) The GPFG, 
amongst others, have been in Ghana and seen how mining operates there, both in 
terms of human rights and environmental concerns and so on” (Informant, Norad). 
 
These investments are described in a positive manner and it is suggested that 
Norway’s experiences from mining could also be passed on to Ghana, despite there 
not being any official aid given to this sector through OfD. A popular alternative 
discourse used by many civil society organisations describes some of the GPFG’s 
investments as being extremely controversial and even unethical (e.g. Framtiden i 
Våre Hender, 2013). Although the fund introduced ethical guidelines in 2004, the first 
country in the world to do so, it is, all the same, continuously criticized for unethical 
investments, for example in coal, and in individual companies who operate using 
environmentally damaging behaviour or with little regard for civil-rights. It is 
strongly argued, therefore, that this ethical framework needs strengthening 
(Aftenposten, 2013). 
 
There was no direct suggestion in the NDD, or in the PPD, of any conflicts of interest 
resulting from Norwegian investments in Ghana, despite this being an argument often 
used about the OfD programme and aid programmes in general. Hoyos (2006) reports 
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that energy company executives pointed out conflicts of interest when Norway 
advised oil-rich governments on licensing rounds in which Norwegian companies 
were bidding. She refers to Statoil, and previously Norsk Hydro, as partially state-
owned companies and highlights the state's partnership with the private sector in 
Norway. A senior executive at an oil company active in Africa stated that ‘Even if 
they are not given preferential status, they often have access to data - such as seismic 
information - before their competition’ (Hoyos, 2006). 
 
Solli (2011) describes Norway’s commercial and geopolitical interests as a 
‘controversial rationale for an aid programme’ (p.74). Although Norwegian aid is said 
to be motivated by values, rather than self-interest, Erik Solheim, at the time 
Norway’s minister of international development, acknowledged that the OfD 
programme was, ‘in fact among the most difficult and delicate we work with’ 
(Solheim, 2009 in Solli, 2011, p.74). Solheim’s expression, ‘difficult and delicate’ 
may be seen in contrast to Norad’s informant’s “but what [the Norwegian companies] 
want to report and things is often limited, and that’s fair enough!” the latter almost 
implying that Norwegian companies may adopt a policy of secrecy when it suits 
them. Transparency in policies and transactions is regarded as an important aspect of 
avoiding a resource curse, yet there appears to be a differentiation between countries 
if Norway is freed from upholding this policy, yet Ghana is being encouraged through 
OfD, amongst others, to use it.  
 
The idea of aid being motivated by values, rather than self-interest, may not always be 
that easy in practice, especially when the embassy has the two roles of combining 
Norwegian commercial interests with administering aid. Norad’s informant worked at 
the embassy for a number of years and has a background from the Norwegian oil 
business. Neither the NDD nor PPD openly described any conflicts of interest, but 
Statoil’s involvement in Ghana being silenced and an undertone of Norway being 
‘above the rules’ in its ‘dealings abroad’ are noteworthy. 
 
According to the findings from an evaluation report of OfD, the programme has 
‘Focused on building the capacities of public administration bodies and avoided the 
commercial concerns of the public sector so as not to be accused of a conflict of 
interest with regard to Norway’s own private sector actors’ (Norad, 2012a, p.27).  
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This implies that the avoidance of contact with the oil companies has been deliberate 
and deemed necessary by Norad, so that OfD may ‘avoid accusations’ as to Norway’s 
own interests in the partner country. Dealings with the oil companies and the 
reviewing of their contracts and procedures in Ghana, was deemed an important area 
where the programme could be improved in the PPD. Oil contracts typically last for 
two to three decades (Bridge and Le Billon, 2013) and I was informed that they are 
extremely difficult to undo or change, making it essential that they contain sufficient 
environmental content and responsibility clauses. This issue may indeed be described 
as ‘difficult and delicate’ and is further discussed in the next chapter. 
4.2.8 Environmental changes in Ghana post-oil production 
When asked if there had been any significant environmental changes after oil 
production had started up in Ghana, all of the informants interviewed agreed that 
there had not been. Some reported that they had heard of instances of dead whales 
being washed ashore, and tar balls which had reached the coastline, but that this had 
apparently not been traced back to the oil industry and could just as well have come 
from other sources. There were also some reports about friction between the oil 
industry and fisheries due to safety zones. Both the NDD and the PPD were very 
decisive in this matter and there were many similarities in responses to this issue. 
 
“What I know to be some issues are that the fisheries have not always understood that 
there are safety zones around the installations which they must stay away from, so 
there’s been some friction there. Also, there’ve been some alleged oil spills that have 
not been traced back to oil production in Ghana, but that could just as easily have 
come from tank pots or other vessels that seep out bunker oil (…)” (Informant, MoE). 
 
It was explained that tar balls can be washed on to the beach in many ways, and may 
originate from, for example, natural seeps and tanker traffic. The geological and 
oceanographical conditions in the Jubilee Field are also described, including that the 
oil is found at extremely deep depths, and that the waters are fairly calm, making it 
highly unlikely that these issues are related to the oil industry. The PPD, nonetheless, 
argues the need for a better oil-spill contingency plan, due to the huge amount of 
tanker traffic along the coast, and an improved VTMIS. 
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In an interview found on a Ghanaian news website, a representative from the EPA 
Ghana was asked about the increasing number of dead whales since oil production 
started up. He remarked that, ‘The whales are not being washed ashore as a result of 
the oil exploration. (…). I have studied geoscience and there is no link between dying 
whales and oil and gas exploration activities’ (Ghana oil and gas online, 2013). 
 
These discourses using phrases such as “alleged oil spills” and that fishermen have 
“not always understood” the concept of exclusion zones present a framing of 
environmental impacts, giving the impression of an uninformed environmentalist 
discourse. The EPA’s statement denies any connection to the whale deaths outright, 
with ‘no link’ to the oil industry, dismissing the environmentalist discourse entirely.  
 
The results of the three-year research by the Nansen team had, at the time of writing, 
yet to be analysed due to alleged disputes on funding and responsibility, so there are 
few scientific sources of data available on environmental impact of the oil industry so 
far. When asked if they had any indications of change, the IMR seemed to think that 
there would be very little and they had not expected there to be either. 
 
“I guess we have an indication that there have not been very big changes since we 
were last there but we’ll have to see the analyses. We may see some minor changes in 
the immediate area.” 
“Its not like we stuck our hands into a pigsty, but that wasn’t really expected either.” 
(Informants, IMR) 
 
Interestingly, a group of Ghanaian scientists have published an article reporting finds 
of high concentrations of toxic chemicals, particularly in the deep-water sites of the 
Jubilee Field, which they report may have serious environmental and ecological 
implications such as the loss of biodiversity and the harming of fish due to the metals’ 
bioaccumulation along the food chain. They suspect these to be the result of drilling 
activities during exploration (Nyarko et al., 2011). The research they carried out took 
place from the Nansen research boat in 2009. This may be seen in contrast to the 
informants from IMR who reported a very limited impact when asked about the oil 
industry’s environmental impact so far. In IMR’s report from the 2009 study, this 
slight increase in metal concentrations at the deep-water sites was explained as 
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‘corresponding to the particle size of the sediment, as smaller particles have higher 
affinity to chemical compounds’ (IMR, 2010 p.57). The concentrations of metals was 
described, in general, as being ‘low’. This point illustrates how different actors may 
reach very different conclusions using the same data. It also illustrates the use of 
framing in discourses and the role of scientific research in decision-making (e.g. 
Tvedt, 2009, Goldman, 2001, Neumann, 2005). 
 
As previously discussed, the IMR informants regarded other coastal and aquatic 
activities as posing a much larger threat to both ecosystems and local communities 
than the oil industry, at present. Others described shipping vessels as a larger threat 
than the oil industry. The informants from IMR also commented on Norway’s 
position as an oil-producing and fish-producing nation and that the two industries are 
possible to combine, but with a lot of effort. 
 
“[Norway has] a very large oil industry and what we see is that all the major fish 
stocks are in very good condition. They have barely been in better condition. All of 
them. And we’ve had an oil business for 40-years. (…) So if you’re careful and have 
monitoring regimes and somehow keep a look out, there’s no problem having multiple 
operations simultaneously. But it requires a lot” (Informant, IMR). 
 
The language used here portrays a somewhat opinionated narrative about Norway’s 
policies and current situation. The on-going issue of oil-exploration in Norway’s 
Barent Sea, in the regions of Lofoten, Vesterålen and Senja, for example, has been a 
controversial political issue for decades, in part due to oil-versus-fishing discussions. 
Some of these arguments are specifically based on data that strongly advises against 
combining oil with the fragile ecosystems and marine species in this area and rather 
suggest the use of the precautionary principle. The argument that fishing and oil can 
be combined then, is place-specific, not even applying to Norway at a national level. 
The discourse given by IMR, that Norway has apparently succeeded in this feat so far, 
is, in any case, not necessarily applicable to Ghana’s diverse ecosystems, fishing 
traditions and oil industry. 
 
An environmental discourse in Ghana has described changes in marine environments 
and fish catch. As described above under section 4.2.6 regarding local participation, 
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the IMR informants described local fishermen as blaming the oil industry for reduced 
catch, as certain organisations had informed them that this was the case. Ghanaian 
environmentalist discourse sources such as FON, however, do not seem to have 
blamed the oil industry directly in many cases, but do demand answers to the negative 
trends that society has noticed. One source reports that fishermen are angry about the 
500-metre restriction zone around the Jubilee Field, with its bright lighting attracting 
fish. Being ‘angry’ about the restriction zone is a different symbol from “not 
understanding it”, as described in the PPD. Pollution, including tar balls, noise, 
tanker traffic and ballast water were also mentioned as being disturbing for fishermen 
(Badgley, 2011). The spreading of decomposing sargassum is also given as being a 
possible result of oil pollution, but has yet to be empirically researched. There have 
also been visible oil spills, and discharge of toxic mud which Kosmos has been held 
responsible for, this being a different rhetoric from the “alleged spills” described in 
the PPD. These issues then, were framed in the NDD and PPD, either intentionally or 
through lack of local knowledge. 
 
A representative from FON, which is a leading environmental NGO in Ghana, 
describes health issues due to gas flaring, in addition to dead whales and conflicts 
between fishermen and the oil industry. He suggests that Ghana had rushed into oil 
extraction, but reports that his organisation wants scientific analysis behind the 
negative trends that civil society had noticed, so that their questioning of the 
industry’s practices was not taken to be propaganda. This may be seen as similar to 
the type of ‘environmentalist propaganda’ that IMR described as blaming the oil 
industry as the root of all evil.  
 
‘What we are doing now is playing catch-up. But the industry is not going to wait for 
us (…) and by the time we catch up, things could have gone out of hand. We should 
be more active, but advocacy should be evidence-based so that the duty bearers do not 
dismiss us as propagandists’ (Oil in Uganda, 2012). 
 
The environmentalist discourse that I have found from various Ghanaian NGO’s is a 
well-considered discourse that suggests that civil society wants to be taken seriously. 
They include concrete environmental events that have occurred post-oil production 
and demand ‘evidence-based advocacy’, rather than jumping to conclusions, such as 
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that described by the informants from IMR, based on their meetings with individual 
fishermen. Until proven otherwise, it is reasonable to question the role of oil pollution 
in the changes that local communities have noticed after oil production started up. 
Respecting these views is an important aspect of hearing the voice of different 
stakeholders and in civil society holding the industry accountable for its actions, if 
and when they are proven. These concepts are included in OfD’s ‘good governance’ 
definitions and according to the NDD, accountability in Ghana works relatively well 
which is why the programme does not direct more focus towards it.  
4.2.9 Evaluating OfD’s environmental management in Ghana so far 
All of the informants felt that their work in Ghana had been helpful, based on 
feedback from the Ghanaians they had been co-operating with, and on their own 
personal impressions of their respective projects. Some pointed out areas that needed 
more focus, many of these being previously described in this chapter. Most were 
optimistic about a renewed three-year contract that was in the making at the time of 
writing and seemed eager to do more. 
 
The informant from Norad suggested strengthening MESTI as a main area of focus. 
Although they had “gained expertise and capacity to do their part of the job”, this 
was “not a job that was completed”. He did, however, in general feel that OfD had 
achieved its main goals in Ghana in developing legislation, structure and appointing 
responsibilities, and in capacity building and staffing. 
 
One informant explained that one of the very positive things in OfD’s work so far was 
Klif’s training with the corresponding departments at the EPA Ghana, when they 
wanted to develop their oil and gas department. He described this as a partnership that 
has continued, including various visits to and from Ghana between the two 
departments. Another summed up his experiences with the programme. 
 
“My experience has certainly been that it has worked. Not in the sense that my mere 
presence has turned all the workers into experts, because we all have our limitations, 
but you can share the skills you have and together you can develop something” 
(Informant, Bergen municipality). 
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The informants from IMR suggested the way forward was for West African countries 
to harmonize their procedures with regard to regulations and monitoring, this 
suggesting a more international approach to environmental management. They did not 
know if this would be included in OfD’s programme, however. They also suggested 
more communication between the different sectors within Ghana and felt that they 
had been, and would continue to be, an arena that brought these together. 
 
“We see that communication between the fisheries authorities and environmental 
authorities in Ghana is not very good, in my opinion. But we’ve had people from both 
institutions with us, so I feel that we are almost a catalyst in trying to achieve co-
operation, and who (…) bring the institutions together on the boat. We’ve also had 
people from the mapping authorities and port authorities and have tried to include as 
many as possible, but it’s a hard job to create something that will last after we’ve 
left” (Informant, IMR). 
 
Several other informants also believed that communication between the public 
sectors, and between the authorities and oil companies, needed much more focus. This 
in addition to increased communication and openness within institutions. Some stated 
that the bringing ashore of gas, and the infrastructure involved in this, would be a 
great challenge, while others discussed the use of onshore exploration in the Volta 
region as a big challenge in the possible future. The risks and opportunities involved 
in onshore exploration, particularly with regard to drinking water which is collected 
from the Volta Basin, were discussed in detail, with onshore exploration in general 
being described as “a whole different ballgame”. 
 
Norad’s evaluation of OfD’s work in Ghana and other countries, carried out by an 
independent organisation, praised OfD’s work in Ghana in many areas. As an overall 
assessment of OfD’s environmental pillar in Ghana the report states that, ‘The 
relevance of the programme is clearly high. Efficiency, effectiveness and impact will 
only become visible over time’ (Norad, 2012a, p.62). It suggests in general that the 
environmental management pillar should have a wider reach and more strategic 
approach. This includes ‘identifying the full range of actors that could be included in 
the environmental capacity development programme: public sector offices, civil-
society organizations, media, youth groups etc.’ (p.xxiii).  It also suggests more 
	   87	  
clarity in the use of key instruments such as SEAs and EIAs and strengthening 
monitoring. In Ghana specifically, it mentions the role of the EPA and the petroleum 
commission as being somewhat uncertain, suggesting that the authorities need to 
define their position. This may be seen in contrast to the NDD which described the 
“who should be doing what” as being largely in place. The report otherwise praises 
the programme’s progress in Ghana, with the planning of the activities being ‘relevant 
and realistic’ (p.65).  
 
The SEA of Ghana evaluates existing information on the oil and gas sector, describes 
various scenarios of development and includes different stakeholder interests in its 
assessment. It highlights many interesting points and, although not being aimed at or 
about OfD, provides many hints as to areas that need more focus in environmental 
management, which OfD could learn from. These include issues of screening oil 
companies to ensure that they are able to manage oil-spill incidents, investing in 
modernizing the local fishing industry because of potential conflicts between the two 
industries, reviewing legislation for compensation and fines, and integrating research 
into oil and gas development (SEA, 2013). The evaluation report’s suggestion of 
more clarity in the use of SEA’s would seem a point that OfD should consider in its 
future work. 
 
In general, the NDD was less critical in its evaluation of OfD’s environmental 
management than the PPD. In light of their motives for using their respective 
discourses, they chose to emphasize certain aspects of the programme while silencing 
others. The PPD evaluated the programme based more on their own roles in OfD and 
their own experiences through their work. Examples are, the IMR informants 
suggesting more communications between the fishery and oil institutions and the 
Bergen Municipality informant emphasizing work on land-use projects in co-
operation with traditional groups, which he had been in contact with through the 
WRSDF project. The PPD was more reflective about their work and the programme 
as a whole. The NDD also believed they “still had work to do” but did not suggest 
any specific areas of focus that were not already being used through the programme. 
Areas for suggested improvement are available in written form in the SEA and 
Norad’s evaluation of OfD, and it will be interesting to see if these suggestions are 
included in OfD’s future projects. 
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5. DISCUSSION 
 
The previous chapter analysed the empirical data using techniques from qualitative 
geography, including discourse analysis. It firstly examined the environmental 
management strategies used by OfD in Ghana, relating to the first research question. 
The data provided insight as to the inclusion of place-specific and dynamic strategies, 
based on newer research within the field, this relating to research question two. It has 
also identified and examined the discourses being used about the programme’s 
environmental management focus and how different actors describe environmental 
practices and policies in Ghana. This provides answers to research question three. 
This chapter seeks to summarize and further analyse the empirical findings using the 
theoretical concepts introduced in Chapter 2, situating them geographically and 
examining connections between the findings. Research question four, regarding the 
use of a political ecology approach, will be discussed in relation to this process. The 
analysis will then lead to a conclusion as to the extent to which OfD can aid Ghana in 
the environmental management of its oil industry. 
 
5.1 The roots of OfD’s environmental policies 
In order to further understand the influences and motives surrounding OfD’s 
environmental policies, it is necessary to examine the programme’s own geographical 
and historical roots, in accordance with using a place-specific and dynamic approach 
to research (Logan and McNeish, 2012). It also aids in stakeholder analysis of the 
actors working on OfD’s environmental pillar, making it more possible to situate the 
empirical data (Aase and Fossåskaret, 2007). This process leads very much to 
Norway’s own oil experience or the ‘golden standard’ of the Norwegian model, as 
quoted in Norad’s evaluation. It also includes global influences on oil policy, and 
larger trends within development aid such as ‘new aid architecture’ (Sande Lie, 
2011). These factors, in addition to hidden motives which emerged through the 
discourse analysis, define the nature of the OfD programme’s environmental pillar. 
5.1.1 The Norwegian experience 
Norway’s roots for its environmental policies in OfD can firstly be traced back to its 
own oil industry. Norway is often given as the ‘exception’ in resource curse literature 
and its oil history has been carefully analysed in order to understand how the country 
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managed to turn its oil into a blessing. The Norwegian model has become a byword 
for avoiding the negative effects of oil production on its markets and social fabric 
(Logan and McNeish, 2012). It is hardly surprising that Norway’s advice through 
OfD is sought after then, and that, according to the NDD, it is one of the most popular 
and in-demand Norwegian aid programmes.  
 
Norway’s oil industry began some 40 years ago and the analysis shows that it did not 
have a particularly well-organized environmental policy to begin with, this including 
spills, pollution, and issues of corruption related to oil companies ‘pushing’ 
consultants to change their results. Norway has, however, had time to learn from its 
mistakes and is described as having a good system of environmental management in 
place today. The discourses describe Norway’s desire to pass these lessons on to 
others through OfD. It is argued, though, that there is no single Norwegian experience 
and that Norway’s apparent success is due to a number of variables. The country’s 
position prior to extraction, as a highly developed, technologically advanced and 
honest bureaucracy with a strong democratic state are given as reasons by Karl 
(2007). It is also argued that conflicts between oil actors and society, and society’s 
determination to secure its own power and position in relation to the big companies, 
had a major role to play (Ryggvik, 2010 in Logan and McNeish, 2012 p.4). The 
power of the trade unions and the moderate rate of production in the early years are 
also given as variables which shaped Norway’s oil story, this revealing a more 
dynamic political picture than is often suggested. In general, Norway’s ‘golden 
standard’ was far more complex and more conflict-filled than often portrayed through 
the various discourses about the industry, including the NDD. 
 
Even today, there remain environmental conflicts in Norway over oil exploration in 
the Barents Sea. There are debates as to whether the country should continue its ‘oil 
dream’, despite the PPD suggesting that the fishing and oil sectors can be successfully 
combined, with pollution from the oil industry being largely a thing of the past in the 
country. It is exactly conflicts of interest between fisheries and oil in the North of 
Norway which is the focus of this debate, however, and, in addition, wider 
discussions over a transition from oil to renewable energy, which should arguably be 
the general focus of development aid programmes (Bridge and Le Billon, 2013, 
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Maass, 2010). Yet communication between these sectors was described as ‘missing’ 
from OfD’s programme in Ghana.  
 
The analysis shows that the OfD programme is directly based on Norway’s 
experiences from its oil sector, but whether these are based on the ‘golden standard’ 
discourse or on the alternative discourse, which describes a more complex version of 
Norway’s oil history, may be discussed. The former portrays a fault-free Norwegian 
model ready for export, while the latter includes a multi-level historical and 
geographical analysis of Norway’s situation today, including a more dynamic social 
and political picture. 
5.1.2 Global oil policies 
On a global scale, OfD follows the internationally accepted strategies contained 
within  ‘good governance’, which includes buzzwords such as ‘transparency’ and 
‘accountability’. These concepts are supported and promoted by a great number of 
international organizations such as the World Bank, PWYP and EITI. They may be 
seen as contributing factors both for oil policy in Norway today and in OfD’s policies 
with its collaborating countries. They have their roots in resource curse theory, very 
much based on economic and political principles at the macro level of governance. 
Sande Lie (2011) describes the strategies used by aid organizations today as ‘new aid 
architecture’, and I argue that OfD may be generalized into this category. The concept 
suggests the use of a rhetorical participatory approach, although in practice the 
agencies hold a degree of control, which has been observed throughout the empirical 
findings. 
 
Both the NDD and PPD suggested a ‘participatory’ process in their work with Ghana. 
Expressions such as ‘playing ball’ were used to illustrate this. The analysis shows that 
needs-assessments were the starting block for the environmental pillar in Ghana, 
suggesting a participatory decision-making process. The Ghanaian environmental 
authorities did not know what help to ask for, however, so it was deemed necessary 
that the Norwegian side took more control over decision-making, in terms of what 
strategies were necessary. Although ‘participation’ through such meetings and 
workshops was described, one may also apply the concept of ‘environmentality’ here, 
in which local officials learn that in order to speak with expertise on development and 
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planning issues they must adopt the neoliberal eco-rationalities and technologies 
presented to them through these meetings (Goldman, 2001). It could be argued then, 
that the Norwegian model, based on global principles in extractive industries, is 
projected into Ghana’s development of its oil sector, to a large extent using a top-
down approach, although the NDD and PPD’s rhetoric describe otherwise.  
5.1.3 Norway’s motives for its aid programmes 
Norway’s motives for OfD and other aid programmes are often contested, as shown in 
Chapters 2 and 4. Tvedt (2009) describes Norway as having a national ‘do-gooder’s 
regime’ which is flawed from the start. Logan and McNeish (2012) strongly criticize 
Norway’s investments and dealings abroad and suggest that OfD’s motives and 
actions are therefore also questionable. The informant from Norad, who has a 
background from the Norwegian oil industry, the Norwegian embassy in Ghana, and 
now works for OfD, admitted that the embassy, ‘wears two hats’, one to administer 
aid and the other to promote Norwegian economic interests. The view that there was 
any conflict of interest related to this was silenced in the informant’s discourse. 
Another of OfD’s employees reported that he was ‘tired’ of denying these conflict of 
interest claims.  
 
It is argued that OfD is probably one of the most important tools the Norwegian 
government possesses to aid the reputation of its own oil industry, this in particular 
after a Statoil corruption scandal in Iran in 2003 (Ihlen, 2007 in Solli, 2011). Statoil 
has also been involved in further ‘scandals’ since 2003, both nationally, such as their 
refusal to pay a fine after a seven year leak in the Veslefrikk field in the North Sea, 
and internationally, such as its controversial tar sand industry in Canada. Ihlen argues 
that the Norwegian oil industry badly needs support of the view that their companies 
and aid programmes ‘do good’ abroad, in order to expand internationally. Norwegian 
aid being established in Ghana after the country’s oil discovery may be seen in 
relation to this argument. 
 
Although I did not personally gain any insight as to specific conflicts of interest 
through my research, there are certain aspects of the discourses that are noteworthy. 
The NDD very much promoted the view of Norway’s popularity, which relates to 
Ihlen’s argument, perhaps in an attempt to make this discourse hegemonic. This was 
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seen in phrases such as, ‘everyone speaks very warmly about Norway’, and other 
descriptions of OfD’s ‘popularity’ due to Norway’s own ‘successes’. It was also 
exclusively positive in its description of Norwegian investments in the mining 
industry in Ghana. The fact that Statoil had at one point bought a share of a license in 
the Jubilee Field was also silenced. Neither was there any mention of conflicts of 
interest in the PPD. This may then be described as framing in both discourses. 
5.1.4 Resulting environmental policies 
Based on these factors then, the environmental programme in Ghana includes a main 
focus on environmental governance, through capacity building and developing of 
legislation at MESTI in particular, and also the EPA Ghana. Capacity building is 
aimed at strengthening these institutions and appointing responsibility so that they 
have the ability to enforce legislation. The system of environmental management 
suggested is based on the polluter pays principle, as in the Norwegian model. Focus 
on civil society was described as being covered by other groups (including the World 
Bank) so this aspect of ‘good governance’ is supported in economic terms only. 
Specific participatory strategies such as needs assessments, twinning, development of 
the SEA and the Nansen research cruises, were chosen as being the most relevant for 
OfD financed collaboration in Ghana. The extent to which these policies are relevant 
and place-specific will now be discussed. 
 
5.2 Place-specificity in OfD’s environmental policies 
New aid architecture discourses, such as the NDD, describe a participatory approach 
which includes civil society and local knowledge, and that is ‘tailor-made to suit 
domestic needs’. Examining Ghana’s starting-point at the time of collaboration with 
OfD provides a basis for this investigation. The decision-making processes that led to 
OfD’s strategies is also, however, coloured by the power relations and motives 
underlying the programme, as defined in the previous section. 
5.2.1 OfD’s starting-point in Ghana 
According to the resource curse discourse, Ghana’s starting-point in terms of its 
governance and the strength of its institutions is deemed as influencing the outcome 
of its oil experience. Both discourses agreed that these were not in place but that the 
country had a better chance of succeeding than other African countries that OfD was 
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involved in. Corruption was said to exist ‘everywhere’, without specific examples 
being given in the interviews. This strengthens the argument of the need for strong 
institutions that monitor and regulate the oil companies’ activities, based on the 
polluter pays principle, and this is a main focus in OfD’s Ghana collaboration. 
 
In the analysis, Ghana was described as a relatively democratic African country with 
many natural resources, a developed institutional structure and a ‘curious and willing 
population’, a high percentage with a basic education. Fishing is one of the country’s 
main sources of income and livelihoods in coastal regions, not dissimilar to Norway 
prior to oil extraction. The majority of fisheries are small-scale and highly vulnerable 
to environmental change. In addition to fishing, mining, and in particular gold mining, 
was and remains an important industry, although the socio-economic benefits of this 
are debated. This varied economy is deemed beneficial in avoiding economic 
distortions associated with a resource curse. 
 
Although the NDD spoke positively of Norwegian investments in mining, the PPD 
spoke less positively of the industry, but blamed environmental damage largely on 
illegal mining. Some studies seem to support the view that mining companies are 
committing more to CSR (Obeng-Odoom, 2014), in line with the discourses given in 
the NDD. Others conclude that gold has done more harm than good in general, with 
environmental and social costs highlighted (Taabazuing et al, 2012 in Obeng-Odoom, 
2014). A main reason given for the mining sector not leading to economic 
development and better social welfare is institutional weakness. There is also a lack of 
incentives to improve institutional performance and governance of the sector (Ayee et 
al., 2011). The extent to which Ghana’s experiences from the mining industry will be 
duplicated in its oil industry are questionable. In general, the dynamics of gold are 
different from oil so that even similar processes may generate different political, 
ecological and socio-economic outcomes (Obeng-Odoom, 2014).  
 
In environmental management, particularly the EPA Ghana was described in the 
analysis as a ‘rare strength’ compared to many other lesser-developed countries. 
MESTI was described as ‘relatively weak’.  The ‘high standing’ of the EPA appears 
to be something that has created conflicts in OfD’s work, as they apparently ‘refused 
to listen to Norway’s advice’ regarding the sharing of responsibilities between the 
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private and public sectors, and what Ghana wanted of equipment and services. This 
attitude on the part of the EPA led to OfD’s financial aid for the carrying out of 
analyses being withheld by the embassy as a direct consequence of their behaviour, a 
form of Foucauldian ‘power’ and ‘discipline’. The ‘strength’ of the EPA could then 
be described as backfiring somewhat, since they are ‘free to ignore advice’, yet at the 
same time bound by ‘conditions’, as described in the concept of developmentality. 
This whole issue was omitted in the NDD, with the will of the EPA being silenced. 
Institutions may be hard to change due to their long history, social cohesion or 
political and economic interests (Stevens & Dietche, 2008 in Solli, 2011) and perhaps 
the EPA was unwilling to be changed to the degree that OfD suggested, in part, due to 
these factors. 
 
Communication within the institutions was also described as being poor in the PPD, 
with well-educated elite receiving most of the ‘capacity building’ schemes aimed at 
the institutions, whilst the workers lower down in the system were left behind. 
Possible reasons for this lack of communication may be found in Ghana’s political 
history and social structure, such as the lack of trained staff due to the economic 
decline of the 1970s (Whitfield, 2010). 
 
The extent to which OfD has considered these unique Ghanaian factors in its policies, 
from the time they entered the agreement in 2008 until the present date, will now be 
discussed. Both discourses claim that they use ‘adjustments’ to their Norwegian 
experience, making their policies place-specific and relevant.  
5.2.2 Place-specific OfD strategies in Ghana 
Some of the specific strategies used by OfD appear to be relevant, efficient and 
helpful in strengthening Ghana’s environmental management of its oil industry. The 
WRSDF land-use planning scheme is place-specific, inclusive and thorough. The 
routing of pipelines, road building, and the ‘opening’ of land for development can 
cause social and environmental impacts (Bridge and Le Billon, 2013), and the 
management of this development is therefore of high importance. Needs-assessment 
projects, and capacity building and ‘twinning’ between the institutions were deemed 
‘important’ and ‘helpful’ processes, as the staff learned some of the challenges and 
complexities of the oil industry based on Norway’s experiences. 
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The SEA of the oil and gas industry is thorough, although currently, the ‘capacity’ for 
its implementation is arguably not sufficient. Norad’s evaluation report suggests that 
OfD’s focus on SEAs is very positive, since the oil companies’ EIAs may have a 
more distorted focus (Norad, 2012a). The SEA may then be seen as forming a 
starting-point for a ‘national plan’, which was deemed necessary if Ghana is to follow 
the Norwegian model of the polluter pays principle. 
 
The Nansen ship has provided important place-specific environmental data through its 
research cruises, an absolute necessity in environmental management. Unfortunately, 
analysis of the latest samples remains absent due to disagreements between the two 
countries. If they are carried out, however, this will provide vital information as to 
chemical and biological changes related to oil production. 
 
5.3 Criticisms and omissions 
	  
5.3.1 Capacity building and environmental governance 
I suggest that issues relating to environmental management often fall outside the 
standard, internationally accepted strategies used to avoid a resource curse, based on 
the concept of good governance. The PPD also agreed with this, describing 
environmental policy as being ‘peripheral’ in resource curse theory. ‘Environmental 
governance’ is included in OfD’s concept of ‘good governance’, along with terms 
such as ‘sustainability’, but these lack the inclusion of the complexity of 
environmental management, as described in the concept of political ecology. 
 
With OfD being very much based on resource curse theory, it is possible to question 
where the research foundation and decision-making basis for its environmental 
policies come from. The focus of the programme is largely on capacity building, and I 
also question to what extent environmental concerns may be addressed within this 
strategy. One area which was highlighted through the interviews was that the training 
projects, or capacity building, was largely aimed at the top layer of elite and there 
seemed to be little ‘trickle-down’ of this knowledge and expertise to those working 
more ‘on the ground’. Both the NDD and PPD deemed their own work with capacity 
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building ‘useful’ and ‘helpful’ at the levels they had worked at, this based partly on 
feedback from their Ghanaian ‘partners’. There was agreement that capacity building 
at different levels was both the most important and perhaps the most difficult tool that 
they had. 
 
According to the evaluation of OfD’s environmental pillar in Ghana, current 
regulations were inadequate at an institutional level with clear laws, policies and 
regulations not being in place. It does state that the public sector bodies are in place, 
however, with a relatively strong administration and good co-ordination with Klif 
(now NEA). In general, the report deems that capacity building has not been sufficient 
in helping to develop adequate regulations, but that the collaboration with Klif in 
particular has helped to strengthen the capacity of the EPA and MESTI to some 
degree. 
5.3.2 Oil company communication and responsibility 
Norad’s evaluation of OfD also highlighted specific areas in environmental 
management that the programme does not systematically deal with. This included risk 
sharing and recourse for pollution damage under potential emergency situations, and 
hazardous wastes from drilling fluids and mud, which in some cases were not 
mentioned in agreements at all, at other times without definition (Norad, 2012a). The 
report suggests the ‘need for much tougher implementation’ including precise 
formulation on responsibilities and rules for costing, this through supplementary 
environmental regulation to petroleum laws and review of the oil companies’ 
Production Sharing Agreements (PSA) (p.68). Oil companies may use PSA’s to seek 
recourse for pollution costs, and some are directly contradictory to environmental 
regulations that are in place. The report suggests greater transparency in this area, 
according to EITI’s principles. 
 
The fact that many of those interviewed did not know the content of contracts and 
agreements between the oil companies and authorities was therefore surprising in this 
respect. The informant from Norad stated that he did not know the details of these 
contracts, but that it was ‘relatively tidy’ in Ghana. Others had read parts of 
contingency plans and were extremely negative to the obvious omissions with regards 
to responsibility in the case of pollution. The relationship was described as ‘difficult’ 
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and ‘an unresolved potential’, and the lack of communication highlighted as being an 
important omission in OfD’s work. I was told that OfD indirectly worked with the oil 
companies through their capacity building and needs assessments with the EPA and 
ministries, but, at the same time, that the flow of information was poor due to various 
internal power struggles between the elite and other workers. The authorities were 
also described as having a ‘cautious attitude’ towards the oil companies. The concept 
of oil enclaves, or a ‘state within a state’ may be applied here, with the companies 
having their own rules and systems of governance. This may be intimidating to the 
Ghanaian authorities which do not have experience in dealing with them. 
 
The reason for OfD not dealing directly with this issue was suggested in Norad’s 
evaluation report: that OfD has allegedly avoided contact with the oil companies 
involved in Ghana so as ‘not to be accused of a conflict of interest with regard to 
Norway’s own private sector actors.’ If it is correct that the authorities have a 
‘cautious attitude’ towards dealings with the oil companies and that the EPA ignored 
advice given by IMR regarding omissions in the contingency plan, then there is 
perhaps little OfD can do through capacity building in this area. It is, nevertheless, the 
area that may have the most impact on livelihoods and ecosystems with regards to the 
responsibilities and costs of spills and other forms of pollution. 
 
The analysis has shown that in the case of oil pollution and spills, Ghana does not 
seem to have a sufficient national contingency plan that covers both inhabitants and 
ecosystems, with ‘who should be doing what’ remaining somewhat open to 
interpretation. Although the EPA is supposed to be playing a leading role in the 
environmental regulation of the oil industry, the Ghana Maritime Authority (GMA) 
has the official responsibility of controlling marine pollution, but with a lesser remit 
than the EPA (Obeng-Odoom, 2014). The GMA was not mentioned by any of my 
informants. Obeng-Odoom (2014) suggests that in the face of such institutional 
weaknesses, the state tends to depend on the goodwill of the oil companies to self-
regulate. The PPD suggested that it is the enforcement of a national plan, which 
ensures that the oil companies are carrying out their appointed responsibilities, that is 
most important and currently insufficient. This work had apparently been hindered by 
the EPA’s ‘attitude’, which preferred a different emphasis, namely to have more 
control of monitoring responsibilities themselves. 
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5.3.3 MESTI and the EPA Ghana 
Although the NDD described their main focus as being on MESTI, there was very 
little information in the analysis about this institution. The vast focus of the narratives 
was on the EPA. Local discourses have less faith in the EPA’s strength than described 
in the NDD and PPD. In a study, most of those interviewed in an oil community did 
not believe that the EPA has the necessary capacity to execute its responsibilities 
(Egyir, 2012 in Obeng-Odoom, 2014) and the EPA is described as being poorly 
resourced and lacking in key instruments to put their plans into effect (Taabazuing et 
al, 2012 in Obeng-Odoom, 2014). The PPD suggested that although much of the 
‘paperwork’ was in place, the authorities lacked the capacity to carry out and enforce 
their plans and regulations. In this respect, more capacity building, but at practical 
levels of enforcement, could be emphasized in OfD’s programme. 
 
A coral reef was mentioned, that the EPA seemed very eager to protect after it was 
first discovered on a research cruise by the Nansen ship, although it was a fair 
distance away from the nearest rig. It was suggested that the EPA almost needed to 
have a ‘specific thing’, such as a coral reef, to protect because they did not seem to 
fathom the extent of their responsibility and work. Perhaps it is too early on in the 
process for there to be enough visible changes, making the risk potential seem 
somewhat smaller to them. OfD can perhaps do little to change their attitude in this 
respect. The issue of dead whales being washed ashore was, however, quickly 
dismissed by the EPA as not possibly having anything to do with oil, although studies 
on the impact of seismic exploration suggest otherwise (e.g. Patin, 1999, Compton et 
al., 2007). 
5.3.4 Communication between sectors 
It was highlighted in the PPD that other institutions, such as those related to fisheries, 
and other more local stakeholders, such as the traditional chiefs and environmental 
NGO’s, should be more involved in the decision-making process and the sharing of 
expertise and skills. Also communication between the oil sector and other industries, 
including mining and fishing, was said to be lacking in OfD’s programme. The lack 
of policies aimed at co-operation between the oil and fishing industries is surprising 
given Ghana’s geographical position and the social, cultural and economic importance 
of the fishing industry in particular. The location of the oil fields is offshore, 
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potentially impacting fish stocks and coastal areas. Although this co-operation is 
suggested in the SEA, it does not seem to have been implemented in any way through 
OfD, other than the actors from IMR ‘bringing together the different sectors on the 
Nansen boat’, a co-operation that they admitted was unlikely to continue ‘after they 
had left’. Norway’s success in combining these sectors has therefore not been 
transferred to aid in Ghana’s needs. 
5.3.5 Civil society 
The secrecy of transactions and contracts between the public and private sectors is the 
area of resource curse theory that is perhaps the most relevant in environmental 
management, and also the area that I feel is most lacking in OfD’s programme. So 
long as they do not take part in the private sector’s dealings, they can only encourage 
the authorities to practise transparency. With Norwegian commercial interests 
involved, this ‘encouragement’ may even be lessened. If certain aspects of the 
resource curse’s rent-seeking behaviour are already occurring, accountability will 
become increasingly less attractive for the elite to practise without a great deal of 
pressure from, for example, civil society groups. As previously discussed, pressure 
from civil society in Norway’s own oil industry was given as a main factor for its 
relative success.  
 
OfD does support civil society groups to some extent. Norad’s evaluation states that 
although the programme supports such groups financially through separate funding 
sources, it does not directly support them, this being an area of potential. Throughout 
the research, I often found it somewhat confusing when trying to establish which 
projects and funding came from OfD and which came from separate sources. There 
seemed to be a lack of co-ordination here and some contradictions, an area which has 
also been criticized in the evaluation report. More direct contact with civil society 
groups could be beneficial for OfD’s future decision-making processes in Ghana, as a 
source of local feedback on actual areas with an unresolved potential. Funding alone 
has a limited impact, whilst creating arenas for stakeholders to meet may have a much 
greater one on Ghana’s environmental management as a whole. 
5.3.6 Environmental research 
I would argue that more specific environmental strategies using current research on 
the environmental management of the oil industry are needed in order to provide a 
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more complete picture of risk-assessment and pollution reduction. Patin (1999), for 
example, has provided an extensive study of the environmental effects of the oil 
industry throughout the different stages of development. There also exists a wealth of 
information on risk-assessment techniques with regard to oil production which could 
be incorporated (e.g. Salter and Ford, 2001, Patin, 1999).  
 
Although the Nansen ship has carried out tests of the sea-floor and water column, 
none of the informants could describe environmental mapping done along the 
coastline in relation to oil production. According to Obeng-Odoom (2014), the EPA 
Ghana has not carried out risk assessments for farmers and fishermen or the 
environment in the Western Region, but claims that ‘Ghana’s offshore petroleum 
industry has had no significant effects on the marine and coastal environment for now 
due to minimal activity’ (EPA Ghana, quoted in Obeng-Odoom, 2014 p.270). In an 
OfD evaluation report from the summer of 2014, a monitoring survey of the coastline 
had reportedly been completed, suggesting that this omission was very recently 
included in the programme (Scanteam, 2014). I would, all the same, suggest more 
focus in general on environmental research and risk assessment, using geographical 
methods such as GIS to map-out potentially fragile areas. This approach to 
environmental management is more qualitative, which, according to Patin (1999), 
allows a differentiation of impact factors and provides a relative assessment of the 
possible consequences of these. As described in the analysis, the environmental and 
social costs of coastal pollution could be substantial, and risk assessments and 
systems of compensation are therefore vital.  
 
I would also suggest more focus on the environmental impacts that have already 
occurred, tracing them back to their sources. This was an aspect that was entirely 
silenced in the NDD and to some extent the PPD. The EPA has also disregarded 
reported environmental changes, denying their connection to the oil industry. Yet 
Kosmos Energy has apparently spilled 706 barrels of toxic substances into the sea, 
causing severe environmental damage, which it was fined for after an investigation 
(Obeng-Odoom, 2014). Environmental narratives describe less fish catch, an 
increasing number of dead whales being washed ashore, health issues due to gas 
flaring, and conflicts between fishermen and the oil industry, mainly due to exclusion 
zones. Articles published by Ghanaian scientists, who had been on the Nansen 
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research cruise, also report pollution on the sea-floor, probably as a result of 
exploration, but these results where not mentioned in the NDD or PPD. As Neumann 
(2005) argues, although actors agree on the central facts and events, they come to 
very different conclusions about causes and effects. With the exception of the Nansen 
research boat, OfD does not deal directly with any of these issues of environmental 
change, and to some extent appears to dismiss their existence, or at least their 
importance, with the EPA apparently following suit.  
 
5.4 The discourses surrounding OfD’s environmental management 
The two main discourses that were identified in the empirical analysis were the NDD 
and the PPD. From the research, two other discourses also emerged, the 
environmentalist discourse and the CSR discourse. I also described a local discourse 
regarding the capacity of the EPA. 
 
I have argued that the NDD may be generalised into the ‘new aid architecture’ 
concept. The NDD suggests a participatory approach without conditionality, yet it is 
more rigid in its approach to development than its rhetoric often suggests, defending 
OfD’s main focus at the macro-level with phrases such as ‘after all, that’s where 
policy-making occurs.’ It uses international consensus to imply that there is only one 
approach to development of an oil sector (Solli, 2011), and although the discourse 
suggests ‘adaptions’ of this approach, the analysis shows that examples of these 
adaptions in policy have been too few. I also argue that the NDD may be said to use 
developmentality, as I have shown throughout the analysis. This silences other 
development and environmental discourses, and therefore the ‘freedom’ used in 
OfD’s rhetoric is framed by their objectives and standards and their will to make their 
policies and practices hegemonic (Sande Lie, 2011).  
 
In many ways, the PPD may also be categorised in the same way, and I have shown 
that in the concept of environmentality, the role of professionals is firmly integrated 
in the ‘grand development scheme’ of aid organisations, also with the aim of 
hegemony. I would, however, underline a distinction here on several issues. Firstly, in 
the case of OfD’s lack of communication with the operating oil companies, where 
actors using this discourse described the seriousness of this omission in OfD’s 
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programme, in contrast to the NDD, which framed the issue. Within the PPD, I would 
also highlight subtle differences between the actors’ responses on certain issues. In 
general, the discourse seemed reflective on aspects that were lacking in the 
programme and its shortcomings, such as a more inclusive approach at different levels 
and better forms of communication between different actors at different scales, this 
agreeing with newer research. All the same, some of the actors’ framing of Ghana’s 
environmental impact so far is noteworthy. 
 
Some assumed the scientific superiority of Norway in a manner more similar to the 
NDD. This may, in part, be due to these experts having little confidence in the skills, 
experience and knowledge of ‘ordinary people’ (Scott, 1998), since the Ghanaian 
environmental discourse was so readily dismissed. It may also be seen as an attempt 
to make OfD’s discourse hegemonic through the role of experts framing local 
discourses, in accordance with environmentality. This issue may be seen in relation to 
the suggestions of Robbins (2006): that we examine firstly if oil pollution has 
occurred in Ghana’s Western Region, and continue by analysing who carried out the 
research, how the pollution is categorized and by whom, who the research is being 
financed by, and who may gain from its results being positive or negative.  
 
In the categorizing of pollution due to oil-related practices, the PPD implied that the 
results were ‘nothing to worry about’ and that other activities damaging the 
environment in Ghana should receive more focus than the oil industry. Ghanaian 
scientists disagreed and considered the oil-related changes to be significant and worth 
public attention. The environmental discourse used by local groups and individuals 
describes concrete changes in their communities’ environment and demands answers 
as to why these changes are occurring. It may be questioned why this environmental 
discourse is dismissed as being uninformed without further investigation. Local 
knowledge could be described as being framed and/or underestimated in both 
discourses in this respect. This is in accordance with the concepts of developmentality 
and environmentality, where the donor attempts to bring the will of individuals in line 
with their own will.  
 
OfD is financing the environmental research at this stage, and may potentially gain 
from its results. This would imply ‘hidden alliances’ (Robbins, 2006), returning the 
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discussion to Norway’s motives behind the programme and conflicts of interest. The 
oil companies’ responsibility for the funding of environmental monitoring versus the 
EPA’s monitoring, and the lack of national regulations overseeing this process, is also 
an important issue here. Until this division of roles and responsibilities is settled, 
unmonitored and unregulated oil pollution may occur in various forms and quantities.  
 
The discourses regarding conflicts between OfD and the EPA over this matter were 
quite distinct. The fact that the EPA had refused their advice, both in the passing of 
contingency plans and on the responsibility of the oil companies in management, was 
described in a heated manner by the PPD, with talk of ‘punishment’ for their actions. 
Their freedom to reject had consequences. The NDD silenced the issue entirely. With 
the EPA also denying any environmental impact of oil so far, it may be questioned to 
what extent actors from this institution may also be framing environmental issues. 
This could be due to OfD’s influence on them, or that the NDD may be described as 
hegemonic in line with  ‘environmentality’, or perhaps due to other motives. The EPA 
was described as being ‘relatively strong’, yet a local discourse shows that local 
groups have little faith in it. There may also be some form of alliance in this matter. 
Perhaps it is merely the position of a Norwegian university graduate in the EPA that 
portrays this ‘glossy image’ of it to the Norwegian actors in OfD. 
 
Another aspect of the research suggesting the hegemonic nature of the NDD is the 
overwhelmingly positive response to questions regarding the nature of the OfD 
programme in Norad’s evaluation report. Despite the variety and large number of 
informants from both countries, there was open support for the exportation of 
Norwegian experiences through OfD, which was described as free and without 
conditionality, since receivers were free to reject advice. The extent of this hegemony 
will perhaps vary through time and experience. 
 
5.5 The political ecology of OfD’s environmental management in 
Ghana 
This study has used a political ecology approach to examining OfD’s influence on 
Ghana’s environmental management and the use of this perspective in the research 
has revealed some of the complexities involved in this process. It has looked at an 
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environmental issue which concerns human impact on a natural ecosystem, related to 
oil production, and has tried to understand it in relation to the political and economic 
structures and institutions in which this impact is embedded, this in accordance with 
Neumann’s (2005) definition of political ecology. According to Adger et al. (2001) 
political ecology is the analysis of multi-level connections between global and local 
phenomena in environmental issues as well as decision-making and hierarchies of 
power. The study has looked at multi-level connections in OfD’s programme, for 
example whether civil society is being included throughout the programme’s planning 
and implementation stages, and how national and international policies influence each 
other on a more global scale.  
 
The decision-making process has been widely discussed throughout the discourses, 
for example, how the Norwegian experience provides a ‘blueprint’ which may be 
used as it is, adapted or rejected, all of which we have seen examples of here, and to 
what extent different actors are being involved in the process. Hidden motives, which 
may have influenced the choice of policies, have also been examined, this also 
relating to the concept of environmentality, regarding power relations and hegemonic 
discourses. Hierarchies of power have been analysed, from those of Ghanaian 
fishermen, hierarchies between workers and elite in various institutions, the NDD’s 
attitude towards the importance of their own work, and global oil policies steering 
OfD’s programme. The study has also used Robbin’s (2006) ideas on post-colonial 
environmental research in the categorisation of pollution and who stands to gain from 
the results of the research. Political ecology’s emphasis on the necessity of a ‘bottom-
up’ approach to environmental management has been used throughout the study in 
order to analyse the place-specificity of the programme.  
 
A political ecology perspective, using discourse analysis, has therefore been useful in 
revealing and analysing specific factors which other more macro-level approaches to 
research may have overlooked. An example is the constant contextualisation of data 
including the analysis of categories that data is placed in by different actors. These 
subtleties of analysis may be seen, for example, through the manner in which the 
words ‘assist’ and ‘help’ were used by different actors involved in the OfD 
programme. The interpretation of the context in which they were used placed the 
discourses describing the OfD collaboration in different categories. Also, the 
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categories in which different actors placed the environmental impact of oil, revealed 
the political nature of the programme, this being of great importance in environmental 
research of this type. Analysis of the actors’ roles and statuses was also an important 
tool in the study. 
 
Based on the analysis, and according to the principles of political ecology, I would 
suggest that OfD’s programme as a whole and particularly the environmental pillar, is 
not following newer research within the field of resource extraction, and that its 
predominantly macro-level focus will therefore not have the influence on Ghana’s 
environmental management that is required for its oil industry. I would suggest more 
focus on scientific research of Ghana’s coastline, more risk assessments on 
ecosystems and livelihoods and more specific geographical information on the risk 
areas. This, in addition to the inclusion of local knowledge in decision-making, would 
provide a more complete environmental management package. OfD could carry out 
capacity building within these specific focus areas, involving a wider spectrum of 
authorities, scientists and local participants. I would also suggest more focus on and 
input in the environmental impacts that have already occurred and that may be linked 
to the industry. This relates to accountability, a buzzword in OfD, yet little effort 
seems to have been made to penetrate the oil enclaves and demand answers, due to 
‘cautious attitudes’ and ‘avoiding accusations of conflicts of interest’. 
 
Civil society in Ghana has posed reasonable questions regarding what they perceive 
as changes to their environment, which have yet to be answered by the authorities, 
despite scientific research existing on some of these changes. This very much 
illustrates the importance of considering the political embeddedness of environmental 
research and management. One aspect of research cannot exist without the other, as is 
the main theme of political ecology. Perhaps this pressure from NGO’s and other 
actors will eventually lead environmental management in a more inclusive and 
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
The OfD programme’s environmental pillar is largely based on capacity building at a 
national level of governance, whilst newer literature on resource management and 
environmental management suggests more place-specific and dynamic approaches. 
This analysis has shown the need for capacity building at lower levels of the labour 
force, since the trickle-down effect of knowledge transfer has not had the intended 
effect, in part due to Ghana’s social and cultural history, which may have been 
overlooked in the programme’s policy-making. At the level of elite within their 
institutions, where much of the collaboration has occurred, needs-assessments, policy-
making and capacity building have, arguably, given positive results and lead to the 
strengthening of Ghana’s environmental management structure at the macro-level. 
According to the resource curse hypothesis, this is an important achievement, which 
will benefit oil governance and may therefore reduce the negative environmental 
impact associated with a resource curse. 
 
Some of the specific strategies under OfD’s environmental pillar are both place-
specific and dynamic, such as the WRSDF and Nansen research cruises, both of 
which use geographical techniques in their research, mapping and planning. The 
impact of these schemes may be beneficial to Ghana’s environmental management of 
oil, although the political embeddedness of scientific research and the framing of its 
results must be considered in the resultant policy-making.  
 
Omissions from the programme include co-operation with the operating oil 
companies in order to oversee the content of contracts regarding contingency plans, 
monitoring and responsibilities. The clarity of roles in the case of pollution and spills 
is unclear. Some of the procedures based on the Norwegian oil-model and the polluter 
pays principle, which OfD strongly suggests that Ghana should adopt, appear almost 
voluntary for the oil companies to follow through the lack of a sufficient national 
plan. Yet OfD avoids contact with the private sector in order to avoid accusations of 
conflicts of interest, therefore having limited impact in this important area through 
institutional capacity building. The EPA’s views of their roles and responsibilities 
have at times been in conflict with the advise of OfD, leading to consequences such as 
	   107	  
the withholding of funding. Communication between sectors with overlapping 
interests, such as the fisheries sector, is also poor, yet this has not been an area that 
OfD has focused on, according to the analysis. 
 
The OfD programme uses aspects of environmentality in its collaboration with 
Ghana, with its content to a large degree being defined by the Norwegian actors 
involved with the programme, due to their expertise and experience, and based on the 
programme’s political embeddedness. Framing of the nature of the collaboration, and 
of environmental issues related to oil production, has been revealed in the discourses. 
The hegemonic nature of the NDD has also been illustrated through the framing of 
these issues, bringing the will of the receivers of aid in line with that of the donor’s. 
Although the NDD describes a participatory approach in its rhetoric, this analysis has 
shown that this has not always been the case and that being free to reject aspects of 
the programme leads to a form of disciplinary response, or conditionality. This is in 
accordance with developmentality.  
 
A political ecology approach to the research has been a useful tool in revealing and 
analysing the challenges OfD faces in its collaboration with Ghana. It has been used 
to examine the political embeddedness of environmental management and research, 
including the role of scientific research, power relationships and decision-making 
processes. The perspective requires focus on the unique and place-specific factors that 
influence environmental policy and practice, and, using discourse analysis, subtleties 
in the texts were revealed relating to these factors which other macro-level 
approaches may have overlooked. The importance of these issues in the OfD 
programme’s policies and practices has been illustrated throughout the analysis, and I 
would therefore conclude that political ecology is highly suited to studies of this 
nature. 
 
Based on this perspective, and in order to include a more complete environmental 
management package, I would suggest more focus on specific geographical research 
and risk assessments on coastal ecosystems, including the livelihoods of those reliant 
upon them. The analysis has shown a knowledge gap in this area, despite a new report 
describing some increased focus on this area of research. The report, however, does 
appear to indicate a more positive turn in the collaboration in recent months through 
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the inclusion of more Ghana-specific strategies, as this analysis has prescribed. 
Accountability to local groups and civil society is also largely absent in the 
collaboration with Ghana in any form other than financial aid, despite it being 
included in OfD’s ‘good governance’ definition, and the analysis shows that claims of 
changes to the local environment have been framed by both OfD and its partners at 
the EPA. Such accountability to civil society was a factor in Norway’s own apparent 
avoidance of a resource curse, and should therefore not be dismissed in Ghana’s 
attempt at following the ‘golden standard’. 
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APPENDICES 
	  
Appendix A: Sample interview guide 
Introduction: I’m studying how the Oil for Development programme can aid Ghana 
in the environmental management of its oil industry. 
-Can you tell me your role in the programme? 
Resource curse 
-It is hard to avoid the topic of the 'resource curse' in this issue. Much research agrees 
that a strong democratic government, with the right institutions in place, is necessary 
before oil production starts up. Do you agree with this and was it in place in Ghana 
before production began? (Good governance still key?) 
-Has this become more ‘in place’ in recent years, for example, through the country’s 
experiences from its mining industry? (Cyanide in water, etc.) 
-What separates Ghana from neighbouring countries such as Angola, Chad and 
Nigeria, which have experienced significant environmental damage associated with 
oil production? 
-It is alleged that all instances of the resource curse are different and each country 
experiences different aspects of it. Are there any areas that could be improved based 
on recent research that puts more focus on place-specific issues? To what extent is the 
Norwegian model transferable? 
Environment 
-What are the main focus areas in environmental management in Ghana? (Mapping of 
vulnerable areas, training, etc.) 
-Which groups and institutions do you work with in Ghana and Norway? 
-How has Ofu been received by the various institutions? EPA, ministry? 
-To what extent have the operating oil companies been included the programme? 
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-Feedback from local groups? To what extent have they participated in aspects of the 
programme? 
-Has oil production had any negative environmental impact or affected the fishing 
industry so far? (E.g. Seismic surveys, pollution, reduction of area to trawling). 
-What methods have been used to calculate compensation? 
-What methods and procedures have been used to assess the environmental impact? 
Risk analysis at different levels, locally, nationally? 
-Environmental protection requires continuous monitoring and adaptation through the 
various stages of production. Is Ofd still part of this or have the national institutions 
taken over the work? Feedback? 
-What about long-term monitoring? (Chemicals such as polycyclic aromatic 
hydrocarbons) 
-What is your impression of Ofd's impact on environmental management so far? What 
has been particularly successful and what has not worked as well as expected? 
General 
-Are Statoil still investors in Ghana or have they sold their share? What experiences 
have they had in Ghana? 
-Are the environmental management procedures used in Ghana similar to those used 
in Norway? 
(NB. Although this was the general structure of the interviews, specific questions 
related to the informant’s role in the programme were added where this was felt to 
provide additional and relevant information. Similarly, questions were removed that 
were not relevant to their role.) 
	  
